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Abstract  
 
My dissertation consists of three chapters, which study the relationship between early retirement, 
demographic structure, and savings, international capital flows in developing countries, especially in 
China. The first chapter studies the role of early retirement and pension system as drivers of China's 
persistent high savings.  The main findings are that the early retirement effect contributes to the majority 
of the growth and fluctuation in the saving rate while both early retirement effect and wealth substitution 
effect have a positive impact on the saving rate. The second chapter, accounting for the facts that the 
global current account balance must be equal to zero, re-examines the impact of demographic change on 
the current account balance. The main finding of this paper is that the young dependency ratio has a 
robust and significant negative impact on the current account but the old dependency ratio has an 
ambiguous and insignificant impact on the current account under the general equilibrium condition. The 
last chapter examines studies the role of early retirement and pension system reform as drivers of China's 
persistent high savings and current account surplus with the aid of an opened-economy model. The results 
show that, the dominant early retirement effect coupled with the wealth substitution effect can increase 
the household’s savings. The current account surplus is due to the high savings and the domestic firms 
have financial borrowing friction to access domestic investment. The earlier and earlier actual retirement 
age finally results in the growing saving rates and current account surplus under the restriction of 
domestic investment. 
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Early Retirement, Pension System and the High Saving Rate in
China
Xin Liang∗
Abstract
Since the reform and opening policy, China has maintained remarkable high national saving
rates for over 35 years. Especially from 2000 to 2008, the national saving rate in China rose by
an unprecedented 40%. This paper is the first paper that studies the role of early retirement and
pension system as drivers of China’s persistent high savings. The model in this paper is a closed
economy life-cycle model. The model incorporates China’s fact of early retirement and the 1990s
pension reform. The findings suggest that, qualitatively, the model is capable of generating changes
in the national saving rate in China and the early retirement effect contributes to the majority of the
growth and fluctuation in the saving rate while both early retirement effect and wealth substitution
effect have a positive impact on the saving rate; quantitatively, the model can explain approximately
66% of the increase in the saving rate between 1995 and 2012.
JEL classification: E21, D91, H55, O10
Keywords: early retirement, saving rate, pension system, China
∗Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063, Storrs, CT 06269-1063; email:
xin.liang@uconn.edu
1 Introduction
Since the “Reform and Opening” policy was launched in 1978, China’s economic and social develop-
ment has achieved remarkable unprecedented changes, one of which is an equally remarkable high rate
of saving. While the gross national saving as a share out of the gross domestic product (GDP) hovered
around 35 percent in the 1980s, the average yearly rate climbed up to 42 percent in the early 1990s
(Figure 1). Since the 21st century, when China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
aggregate saving rate started to accelerate, which is surging from 37 percent in 2000 to an unprecedented
52 percent in 2008. After 2000, China’s national saving rates have been one of the highest in the world,
far outnumbering the average saving rates of the world, the high-income area, the middle-income area,
OECD and other East Asian economies during the years of their miracle growth. To be specific, most of
China’s national saving rates are about 1.5 times of the average saving rates of the middle-income area.
And it is about twice of the average saving rates of the high-income area, OECD and world, respectively.
Why are the national saving rates so high in China remains a question worths pondering.
Figure 1: Saving rates: China VS Different Areas of the World
Source: World Bank Indicator
In addition, China has undergone a dramatic economic transformation involving not only fast eco-
nomic growth and sustained capital accumulation, but also major shifts in social systems. The gradually
implemented pension system reform from 1995 to 1997 changed the pension system in China from a pure
Pay-As-You-Go (PSYG) to a combination of both PSYG and Fully Funded (FF)1. This is almost the
very time when China’s national saving rate started to soar. It is not coincident. With the reform of the
pension system, which is highly related to the pension income, the behaviors of consumption, saving and
1For the details about the pension system before and after the pension reform in 1997, see the appendix.
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investment of households will change during both the working period and the retirement period, which
contributes to the change of the saving rates.
China also sets up a much earlier mandatory retirement age2 than other countries with a similar life
expectancy and allows for early retirement.3 Under this circumstance, what accompanies the process
of the pension reform is a noteworthy phenomenon that Chinese people choose to retire earlier than
the mandatory retirement age. In addition, the average retirement age is trending lower constantly.
According to the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) and China Labor-force Dynamics Survey
(CLDS), the average retirement age surged from 53 to 57 in the 1980s. Afterward, it has decreased from
age 57 in 1992 persistently to about 54 in 2004. Finally, the average retirement age remained relatively
stable at around 53 from 2005 to 2015 (Figure 2). These facts can offer potential channels of the early
retirement and pension system to explain the high savings in China.
Figure 2: Average retirement age in China
Source: CHNS and China Labor-force Dynamic Survey(CLDS)
There are already some explanations for this high saving rates from different perspectives including
consumption-smoothing theory, culture, demographic change, pension system and uncertainties. How-
ever, there are different shortcomings and the findings are inconclusive. The details of these imperfections
in the existing literature are discussed in the next section.
In investigating the joint impact of the early retirement effect and the change of pension incomes
brought by the pension reform on savings, the paper makes three main contributions: (i) a tractable
260 for male and 50 for female.
3The retirement policy in China is that, according to the State Council Provisional Regulations on Retirement and
Resignation of Workers, if they have worked for more than ten years, male employees should retire at age 60, female
employees should retire at age 50 and female cadres should retire at age 55. In the heavy labor and high-risk industries,
for example, the mining industry, male should retire at 55 and female should retire at 45. If employees lost the ability to
work which is proven by hospitals, male should retire at 50 and female should retire at 45.
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model linking average retirement age, the change of pension incomes and savings; (ii) its quantitative
version calibrated to macro data; (iii) several decomposition tests to prove the mechanism in this paper.
The theoretical framework incorporates two new elements to the standard life-cycle theory of savings:
early retirement effect and wealth substitution effect. Agents retire earlier than the mandatory retirement
age. To cover the more extended periods of retirement over which accumulated assets will be spread,
agents have to increase their saving rates (early retirement effect). Also, agents’ pension incomes change
due to the pension reform. If the pension incomes increase, the increment of pension incomes can
substitute for the savings for retirement. This will reduce saving rates (wealth substitution effect).
This model thus sheds light on the impact of the interaction between early retirement effect and wealth
substitution effect on savings decisions and saving rates. A stronger policy response of the positive effect
of the early retirement compared to the weaker negative effect of wealth substitution between pension
incomes and savings, encourages the savings response to a large extent. Also, the reduced pension
replacement rate in the 1990s pension reform results in increased pension incomes, which increases
saving rates.
The second contribution lies in the quantitative exploration of my mechanism. A quantitative version
of the model is developed and is calibrated to macro-level Chinese data. We evaluate the quantitative
performance of my model through three angles. First, combining both the early retirement effect and
the wealth substitution effect, we find that the model imputes 66% of the rise in the national saving rates
over 1995-2012. Second, regarding the effect of the change of pension incomes only, the saving rates fall
substantially to a very low level. Third, considering the effect of early retirement only, the saving rates
decrease slightly lower.
Third, this paper designs three decomposition experiments of savings to emphasize the mechanism.
The first test is to force all agents to retire at the mandatory retirement age in China. This can exclude
the early retirement effect and allow us to observe the wealth substitution effect only. The second
experiment is to shut down the pension reform in the model. Since there are no changes in the pension
incomes brought by the pension reform, this allows us to look at the impact of the early retirement effect
only. The third trial is to remove both effects in order to examine their joint effect and the interaction
between these two effects.
The model in this paper is not going to study why people retire early by endogenizing the retirement
decision to match the data of average retirement ages and then try to examine what factors result in the
early retirement. In this paper, given the fact of early retirement, we show that the early retirement effect
contributes to the majority of the growth and fluctuation in the saving rate while both early retirement
effect and wealth substitution effect have a positive impact on the saving rate. The model simplifies
the reality by not distinguishing the difference between male and female, households savings and firms
savings but captures the difference between urban and rural population.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
presents the model. Section 4 shows the calibration of the model. Section 5 discusses the results of static
and dynamic analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is mainly related to the body of the literature which tends to explain the remarkable high
saving rates in China. Most of the paper in the literature investigate the interaction between different
factors rather them the influence of only one element on saving rates. Therefore, various theories on the
explanation can be roughly classified into the following different strands.
Many early studies applied Modigliani-Brumberg’s consumption smoothing theory to study the saving
behavior in China. The theory argues that people desire to translate their consumption from periods of
high income to periods of low income to obtain more stability and predictability. These studies including
Chow (1985), Qin (2003) and Modigliani and Cao (2004) tested similar hypotheses but ended up with
inconclusive findings for the saving behavior of the Chinese. One challenging fact that hardly reconciles
with theories is that, Chinese households continued to save more in anticipation of higher future incomes
instead of consuming more to smoothen lifetime consumption. Studies based on household data also
could not find evidence showing that the current consumption growth is positively correlated with the
past consumption growth in China (Chamon and Prasad (2010)).
Culture is an alternative candidate that can explain the rise in savings. Carroll et al. (1994) argue
that the consumption inertia is related to a culture-based explanation to saving behavior. Since thrift
has been one of Chinese tradition for thousands of years, their consumption growth could have lagged
behind their income growth during the reform period, thus leading to higher household saving. Through
the provincial-level empirical work, Horioka and Wan (2007) find that variations in household saving over
time and space are influenced by the lagged saving rates, which is a result consistent with the existence
of inertia or persistence. However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. As Modigliani and Cao (2004)
argue, the traditional and commonsensical explanation, for example, Chinese people’s thrift, counts
little. Using the 1988–2003 China Health and Nutrition Surveys, Zhao (2007) finds that younger Chinese
cohorts actually have a higher propensity to save than older cohorts after controlling for other saving
determinants. Given that older cohorts usually carry more cultural tradition than younger cohorts, these
findings show that thrift is not an important determinant of Chinese household saving.
Demographic changes induced by China’s one-child policy and the population aging can also affect
the saving rate. Studies from this perspective are often accompanied by the incomplete pension system
in China. The primary mechanisms are summarized as follows. First, since the non-working population
consists of the young and the old who consumes without earning any income, a rise in their share in
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the population tends to reduce national household saving. Second, in a developing country without
a mature social security system, the older population have to rely on the support (long-term care)
from their children. Thus children act as an effective substitute for life-cycle saving. (Choukhmane et al.
(2014), He et al. (2016), Imrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018b)). In addition, Modigliani and Cao (2004) use the
share of the employed population out of the number of minors up to age 15 to approximate demographic
change. They find that the decline in the young population dependency between 1953 and 2000 increased
Chinese household saving through both effects of “fewer mouths to feed” and old-age security. However,
this time series evidence is not confirmed by panel data studies. Neither aggregate dependency ratio
(Kraay (2000)) nor separate accounts of the young and the old dependency ratios (Horioka and Wan
(2007)) are found to have a significant effect on the household saving rates across Chinese provinces.
Applying cohort analysis to data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS), Chamon and Prasad (2010)
reach a similar conclusion that demographic structural shifts do not go very far in explaining saving
behavior in China. Wei and Zhang (2011) consider the saving motive from the perspective of the sex
ratio. They find that Chinese parents with a son competitively raise their savings to improve their son’s
relative attractiveness for marriage and the pressure on savings spills over to other households. However,
they may omit the saving motives in preparing for the education and life expenditure of children as the
children grow up. Specifically, this refers to the difference in the expenditure of raising boys and girls
which is originated from the traditional culture “Poor Boys, Rich Girls.”
Uncertainties including employment, education, health care, and housing services are another im-
portant motivation in studying the high saving rates in China. The uncertainty associated with the
transition could trigger precautionary motives to save. For the employment, the aggressive reforms of
privatization of State Own Enterprises (SOEs) led to mass layoffs in 1997. Given the earnings uncertainty
and unemployment risk combined with liquidity constraints and incomplete unemployment insurance,
Meng (2003) finds that Chinese urban households that experienced past income uncertainty appeared
to have increased their propensity to save in the period of 1995–1999. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2016)
have noted the importance of income uncertainty in explaining the high saving rate in China. How-
ever, reconciling the findings with the macroeconomic facts is difficult. For example, the employment
uncertainty associated with state-sector restructuring continued to rise and reached its peak in the late
1990s. However, the national saving rates did not increase accordingly but rather fell to the bottom of
the valley during the second half of the 1990s. In addition, there has been no large employment shock
since 2000. Therefore, the precautionary saving motive stemming from employment uncertainty does not
seem to explain well the surge in the national saving rate. For the uncertainties in education, health care
and housing services, Chamon and Prasad (2010) argue that these rising private financial burdens could
induce higher household saving, as younger families accumulate assets for future education spending,
older families prepare for uncertain health expenditures, and most people save to prepare for mortgage
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payments or housing upgrades. Although these are plausible factors, their quantitative effects on savings
are difficult to assess. However, intuitively, most of the young adults have already finished their own
education, there is no need to save for that purpose. Also, as individuals retire, fewer uncertainties are
remaining in their life cycles, and the need for buffer-stock savings shrink. Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
have demonstrated that buffer-stock saving occurs mostly at the beginning of the life cycle; therefore,
it is unlikely to be a major explanation for the saving of the entire population. Similar compositional
effects exist for housing expenditures, as higher costs in housing mortgage tend to reduce the disposable
income that can be used in savings.
The last related and important strand of the literature is about the contribution of retirement on
savings through the pension system. Sánchez Martín (2010) assesses the pension reform in the Spanish
economy whose major policies include delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of
pension benefits. They find that the pension reform extends the length of the averaging period in the
pension formula, which reduces the size of pension benefits and finally leads to higher levels of personal
savings and capital accumulation. Fehr et al. (2003) investigate five different reform proposals by means
of an OLG model with endogenous retirement age for the Norwegian economy. This paper finds that even
if the early retirement subsidy is substituted by an early retirement tax, only households in the middle-
income class increase their retirement age. The majority of households retire early, resulting in that the
pension benefits are reduced, and people increase their savings. Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2017)
study the 2011 and 2013 pension reforms in Spain and find that, through delaying the legal retirement
ages, the reforms finally lead to the longer working time. And the lower retirement pensions increase
savings, and this increases the stock of physical capital. However, the reforms studied in this strand
of the literature manipulate the mandatory retirement age, while the pension reform in China from
1995 to 1997 did not. This difference means that the case of China provides a better opportunity to
look at the association between the retirement age and the pension system by excluding the influence
of the change of mandatory retirement age. In addition, the existing early retirement literature mainly
focuses on the pension system in developed countries which penalizes early retirement by a much lower
pension replacement rate. But there are very few studies about China, where there is no penalty for
early retirement.
3 Model
In this section, we present a closed economy life-cycle model or our analysis of China’s saving rate.
The outline of the model follows Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Song et al. (2015). We model the
agents from born to death, which will be further discussed in section 4.1, but the representative agents
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only have an impact on the economy when they enter the labor market at age 224, work until age JW ,
and live up to age J¯ . Many cohorts are included in the model. The economy in this model begins in
1995.5 Different cohorts enter in the year 1995 with different starting ages. Agents are assumed to be
either workers or entrepreneurs. Workers earn labor income during their working years, make exogenous
retirement decision before or at the mandatory retirement age and receive social security after they retire.
There is no private insurance market and the annuity markets are closed as assumptions. There are no
intergeneration transfers. Agents in this economy save because of concerns about the retirement period.
This model abstracts from some potentially important features. First, the model considers neither
idiosyncratic nor intergenerational risk.Even though these two risks are important, it is difficult to insure
in emerging economies. Second, the model ignores within-cohort inequality since public pensions can
also provide some intragenerational redistribution. Last but not least important, this model does not
consider altruism within families as in, e.g., İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018a).
3.1 Worker’s Problem
The life-time utility function of the representative agent at time t is as follows,
Ut =
J¯∑
j=0
βjsju(ct,j , ht,j) (1)
where β stands for a time discount factor, sj is the unconditional probability of surviving till age j
for an agent and sj =
j∏
i=1
ψi. ψi is the conditional survival probability from age j − 1 to age j. ct,j
denotes the consumption and ht,j denotes the labor supply.
The standard utility function including the consumption and the disutility of labor supply captures
preferences as follows,
u(ct,j , ht,j) = log(ct,j)− ζ
h
1+ 1θ
t,j
1 + 1θ
(2)
where θ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and ζ denotes the weight of leisure.
The budget constraint for a representative worker (j ≤ JW ), who works until age JW , is as follows,
ct,j + at+1,j+1 = (1 + rt)at,j + (1− τt,j)wtjηjht,j (3)
where at+1,j+1 is the asset holding for the next period, and rt is the domestic saving interest rate. τt is
the labor income tax and wt is the wage rate. j is the deterministic age-dependent productivity at age
j. ηj represents the human capital at age j.
4Chinese teenagers generally enter college at 18 and graduate at age 22.
5There are two reasons to choose 1995 as the beginning year of this model. First, China’s pension system reform started
to implement between 1995-1997. Second, China’s saving rates started to increase in 1995.
8
In addition, since there is no private insurance market, each individual has to self-insure the risks she
faces through asset accumulation. In any period t, a retired individual of age j (JW + 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯) faces
the following budget constraint,
ct,j + at+1,j+1 = (1 + rt)at,j + pt,j (4)
Following Song et al. (2015), pt,j , the pension received at period t + j by an agent who worked until
period t + JW (and who became “adult” in period t) is computed as follows:
pt,j = σt+JW [νy¯t+JW + (1− ν)y¯t+j−1] (5)
where j > JW ; ν measures the importance of indexed average wage in the determination of social security
benefits; and σt denotes the replacement rate in period t and y¯t is the average pre-tax labor earnings for
workers in period t:
y¯t ≡
JW∑
j=0
µt−jwtsjt−jηt−jht−j,t
JW∑
j=0
µt−jsj
(6)
where µt−jsj is the number of agents of cohort t-j (i.e., who became economically active in period t-j)
who have survived until period t. In particular, µj is the population of age j at year t. j is the survival
probability from age j to age j+1. The numerator in equation (7) is the total pension contribution from
the working population at year t. And the denominator in equation (7) is the total working population.
This fraction represents the "Average Indexed Monthly Earnings" (AIME) of average wage at time t,
which is consistent with the pension reform regulation.
3.2 The life-time problem
The life-time maximizing problem of workers is as follows,
max Ut =
J¯∑
j=0
βjsj(log(ct,j)− χ
h
1+ 1θ
t,j
1 + 1θ
)
s.t.
J¯∑
j=0
sj
Rj
ct,j =
JW∑
j=0
sj
Rj
(1− τt,j)wtjηjht,j +
J¯∑
j=JW+1
sj
Rj
pt,j
(7)
Standard analysis yields the first-order conditions:
ct,0 = λ
−1 (8)
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ct,j = λ
−1βjRj = (βR)jct,0, forj ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, (9)
ht,j = (
wt
ct,j
)θ, forj ∈ {1, 2, ..., JW }, (10)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
3.3 Firms
Goods market is competitive. The representative firm is constant returns to scale with no adjustment
costs. The total technological changes at period t is denoted by At. The firm chooses labor, capital to
maximize a Cobb-Douglas production function Yt = AtKαt L
1−α
t . Where α is the capital-labor elasticity,
Kt and Lt are the effective capital and labor input at time t, and At = A0(1 + gt)t. gt is the exogenous
growth rate of the TFP. This model assumes that this technology is own by a large number of profit-
maximizing, competitive firms.
The capital K follows the law of motion
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (11)
where It denotes capital investment. δ is the constant depreciation rate. The first order conditions that
determine net real return to capital and real wage are as follows,
rt = αAtK
α−1
t L
1−α
t − δ (12)
wt = (1− α)AtKαt L−αt (13)
3.4 Public Sector
The main role played by the public sector is to run a social security system in the spirit of PSYG
before 1995-1997 and a mixed pension system with both PSYG and Fully Funded after 1995-1997 in
China. The government receives taxes from labor income to finance the pension system. Given an initial
pension trust fund, P0, the government intertemporal budget constraint is as follows,
P0 +
∞∑
t=0
1
Rt
(τt
JW∑
j=0
µt−jwtsjt−jηt−jht−j,t) ≥
∞∑
t=0
1
Rt
(
J¯∑
j=JW+1
µt−jsjt−j,t) (14)
where the left hand side of the constraint is the pension contribution from the working population;
the right hand side of the constraint is the pension payment to the retired population.
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3.5 The Competitive Equilibrium
Definition: In a closed economy, a Stationary Equilibrium for given the policy arrangements {τt,j , σt, ν}
and age structure {{µt,j}J¯j=1}Tt=1 consists of a sequence of an individual’s consumption, asset holding
and working hours, {{ct,j , at,j , ht,j}J¯j=1}Tt=1; a sequence of prices, {rt, wt}Tt=1; a sequence of pension
benefits, (pt)Tt=1; a sequence of factors of production, (Kt, Lt)Tt=1; and a sequence of time-variant age-
dependent distribution of individuals {{distt,j(X)}J¯j=1}Tt=1 with the set of state variables X = (a, l) when
1 ≤ j ≤ JW and X = (a) when JW + 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯ such that:
1. Given the prices {(rt, wt)∞t=1}, the individual’s decision rule (ct, at, ht) solves the individual’s
dynamic problems (7).
2. The factor prices are determined by equation (12) and (13).
3. The time-variant age-dependent distribution of individuals follows the law of motion,
distj+1,t+1(X
′) =

∑
{a,l:a′}
distt,j(X) 1 ≤ j ≤ JW∑
{a:a′}
distt,j(X) JW + 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯
(15)
where a′ is the optimal assets in the next period.
4. The capital market clears:
Kt =
J¯∑
j=1
µt,jdistt,j(X)at,j (16)
5. The labor market clears:
Lt =
JW∑
j=1
µt,jht,jdistt,j(X)t,j (17)
6. The social security system is self-financing and determined by equation (14).
4 Calibration
4.1 Demographics
This section describes and parametrizes the demographic model similar to Song et al. (2015) in this
paper.
China faces a major demographic transition not only in the form of the population growth but
also the internal rural-urban migration. This demographic transition interacts with the function and
sustainability of the pension system and saving-investment behaviors. Therefore, we construct in this
section a detailed demographic model. We model both the exogenous population growth and rural-
urban migration by: first, a model without internal rural-urban migration; second, an extended model
of migration with fixed age-gender-specific emigration rates over time.
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4.1.1 Population projections without rural-urban migration
We first start with a model without rural-urban migration. The initial population is classified ac-
cording to their birthplaces, ages, and genders. Under the no-rural-urban migration framework, we take
advantage of the initial population size and distribution from the adjusted 1995 census data, to project
the population in 2000. And the projected 2000 population is targeted to the adjusted 2000 census data.
Regardless of the mentioned time span issue, another reason for this is that, there is a consensus among
economists6 that birth rates have been underreported in Chinese census data, causing a downward bias
of the census data. Take the 2000 census as an example, Zhai and Chen (2007) use the primary school
enrollment rate to adjust the census data and find that there is a deficit of 29.67 to 37.83 million age
0 to 9 children in the 2000 census. To heed this concern, for the 1995 census, we take the rural-urban
population and age-gender distribution from the 1995 census and adjust the data with the subsequent
National Bureau of Statistics(NBS) revisions. For the 2000 census, we not only take the same variables
from the 2000 census with the same revisions but also adjust this according to the linear estimates in
Zhai and Chen (2007), which is to calculate the missing number of children of each age group and add
them to the data.
For the mortality rates in the population projection, the general idea is that, we first take the initial
group-specific mortality rates from data, and then set the mortality rates to match some specific years
in the future. Finally, in the long run, the mortality rate is fixed. In particular, the initial group-specific
mortality rates are derived from the 1995 census. The life expectancy at birth in the initial year is
70.8 years, which is close to the World Development Indicator figure in the same year (70.2). The three
specific years are chosen to be 2020, 2050, and 2080. The mortality rates chosen for these three future
years can match the demographic projection until 2080 by Yi (2007). We use linear interpolation over the
intermediate periods. After 2080, the mortality rate is assumed to be fixed. This can imply a long-run
life expectancy of 81.9 years.
For the choice of fertility rates, we follow the same logic as the choice of mortality rates. The
initial group-specific (urban and rural) fertility rates for 1995 and 2000 are taken from the 1995 one-
percent population survey and the 2000 census, respectively. We interpolate linearly the years 1996-1999.
Between 2000 and 20127, we assume age-specific fertility rates (urban and rural) to be the same as the
2000 level. The average urban and rural total fertility rates (TFR) are 1.2 and 1.988 in the projection,
respectively. Between 2013 and 2050, to be consistent with the claim of the Chinese authorities, as
outlined by the National Health and Family Planning Commission9 and the estimation in Yi (2007)10,
6Mi (2004), Zhang (2005), Zhai and Chen (2007), etc.
7The reason to cut off this time span is that, in 2013, the third plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Party
Congress announced the plan allowing couples to have two children if one of them is an only child, which was rapidly
implemented by provinces.
8The estimated value from the 2000 census and earlier surveys are between 1.5 and 1.8 (see, e.g., Zhang and Zhao,
2006).
9Source: Xinhuanet November 15, 2013
10Yi (2007) estimates that the second-child policy would increase the urban TFR from 1.2 to 1.8 (the second scenario in
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we assume age-specific fertility rates in the rural area to remain constant, i.e., 1.98 and age-specific
fertility rates in the urban area to be 1.811. After 2050, the long-run TFR is assumed to be 2.0766
following the United Nations population forecasts. In particular, we linearly interpolate the TFRs for
the years 2051-2099 from 1.98 to 2.08 in the rural area and from 1.8 to 2.08 in the urban area to smooth
the demographic change.
4.1.2 Rural-urban migration
In the rapid process of industrialization and urbanization in China, a large scale of the rural population
migrates to the city, which will have a profound impact on both the rural and urban population structure.
If we use the place of permanent registered residence (i.e., Hukou) as a classification standard, there are
mainly two categories of rural-urban migrants12. The first category consists of people who physically
move from rural to urban areas but retain a rural Hukou. We call it the Floating Population. The second
category comprises people who change their Hukou from rural to urban even they do not physically move
to cities. We call it the Permanent Population. The sum of the two categories is called the net migration
flow (NMF).
Generally, it is difficult to estimate and predict the rural-urban migration, even for developed coun-
tries. The pervasive legal and administrative regulations in China compound this problem. Although
emigration rates are likely correlated with a series of factors including the urban-rural wage gap, pension
and health care entitlements for migrants, the rural old-age dependency ratio, and so on, we have to
and can only abstract from these factors and assume that the demographic migration only depends on
the age distribution of rural workers. Accordingly, in this simple model of migration, we assume that
the age-gender specific emigration rates that are estimated from the 1995-2000 population projection
are fixed over time. To incorporate rural-urban migration in our population projection, we make two
assumptions. First, the age-gender-specific migration rates remain constant after 2000 at the level of
our estimates for the period 1995-2000. Second, once the migrants have moved to an urban area, their
fertility and mortality rates are assumed to be the same as those of urban residents.
The general idea to estimate the NMF and the age- and gender-specific distribution and use these as
the backbone of the projection of migration. We first use the 1995 census to construct a projection of
the rural and urban population without migration until 2000 based on the method described in section
4.1.1. We then estimate the age- and gender-specific distribution by taking the difference between the
2000 projection of the population without migration and the actual population in the data according to
the 2000 survey.
Yi (2007)).
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12The difference is significant since most non-resident workers are currently not covered by any form of urban social
insurance including pensions.
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4.1.3 Results for the population projection
According to our estimates, the overall NMF between 1995 and 2000 was 91.3 million, corresponding
to 10.2% of the rural population in 2000. Our estimate implies an annual flow of 18.3 million migrants
between 1996 to 2000, (equal to an annual 2.3% of the rural population). This index is in line with
estimates of earlier studies. For instance, Ying (2003) estimates an annual flow between 17.5 and 19.5
million in the period 1996-2000.
The estimated age-gender-specific migration rates are shown in Figure 3. Both the female and male
migration rates peak at age twenty-five, with 7% for both females and males. The migration rate falls
gradually at later ages, remaining above 1% until age forty-five for males and until age forty-eight for
females. Migration becomes negligible which is less than 0.5% after age fifty.
Figure 3: The figure shows rural-urban migration rates by age and gender as a share of each cohort. The estimates are smoothed by five-year moving
averages.
Table 1: Age Structure of migration (%)
Age <15 15-29 30-44 45-59 60+
Ave. of 1995-2000 Census data 9.03 60.53 22.14 5.81 2.49
Simulation in this paper 15.48 51.51 27.07 7.33 -0.57
Simulation in Song et al. (2015) 25.8 64.8 26.5 -8.6 -8.6
Table 1 compares the actual migration structure with our estimates. We also include the estimation
in Song et al. (2015) to provide more information. Even though Song et al. (2015) can match the data
better between age 15 and 44, there exist two points in their paper worth doubting. First, they use
the data in 2000 to project the population and migration in 2005 and then target the age distribution
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of migration between 1995-2000 with their 2000-2005 projection. In fact, the distribution should be
different in these two different time intervals. Second, the two distributions in Song et al. (2015) after
age 45 are relatively large and negative. This may be due to their overestimation of "<15" group which
is 16.77% greater than the data. In fact, due to the culture in China that "people prefer to die at where
they were born", the rural-urban migrants could go back to rural when they become old, for example,
−0.57% of the 60+ group in this paper’s estimation. But the rural-urban migrants aged 45+ account for
a 17.2% reversal rural-urban migrants is less possible. Accordingly, the estimation in this paper is more
reasonable.
Figure 4 shows the projected population dynamics (solid lines). We also compare the population
model without migration (dash lines, counterfactual) with the population model with migration (bench-
mark). There are mainly three findings for the benchmark: first, the rural population declines over the
whole period; second, the urban population as a share out of the total population increases from 51% in
2010 to 83% in 2050 and to over 95% in 2100; third, between 2050 and 2100 there are two opposite forces
that tend to make the urban population stable: on the one hand, fertility becomes very low in urban
areas from 2050 to 210013; on the other hand, there decreasing rural population (red solid line), i.e., the
immigration to urban areas is still increasing and sizable, which offsets the negative urban population
growth.
Figure 4: The figure shows the projected population dynamics for 1995-2100 (solid lines) broken down by rural and urban population. The dashed
lines show the corresponding natural population dynamics (i.e., the counterfactual projection under a zero urban-rural migration scenario)
Figure 5 plots the old-age dependency ratio 14 for rural and urban areas (solid lines). We also plot the
13The urban benchmark (black solid line) line become flat and even starts to decline after 2050
14the number of population aged 60+ as percentage of population in working age (15-60)
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old-age dependency ratio in the no migration counterfactual (dashed lines). The projected urban old-age
dependency ratio is 63% in 2050, but it would be as high as 90% in the no migration counterfactual.
The Chinese pension system only covers urban workers. Accordingly, its sustainability hinges on the
urban old-age dependency ratio. If we ignore the rural-urban migration, the population projection and
the calculation that is associated with the pension system are bias.
Figure 5: The figure shows the projected old-age dependency ratios, defined as the ratio of population 60+ over population 18-59, for 1995-2100
(solid lines) broken down on urban and rural population. The dashed lines show the corresponding ratios under the zero migration counterfactual (i.e.,
the natural population dynamics).
Finally, Figure 6 plots the dynamics of China’s total population from 1995 to 2100. The simulated
population in the model of this paper is in solid line. The dashed line shows the population projection
by United Nation population forecasts. The population projection in this paper rises from 1.20 billion
to 1.38 billion until 2030 and then declines to 1.15 billion in 2100. The United Nation projection rises
from 1.22 billion to 1.41 billion until 2030 and then declines to 1.0 billion in 2100. Both the simulation
and the United Nation projection peak at around 2030 and start to decline. The comparison shows that
this demographic model can project a valid population prediction.
4.2 Preferences
A period in the model stands for one year of real-time. The representative agent only has an impact
on the economy when she enters the labor market at age 22, works until age JW , which is the retirement
age in data in China as described in Section 1, and lives up to age J = 100. To focus on the period
(1995-2010) studied in this paper, the retirement age before 1995 is set to be 60. In particular, according
to the data, the retirement age from 1995 to 1998 is 55, from 1999 to 2004 it is 54 and the retirement age
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Figure 6: The figure shows the comparison between the simulated population and the forecast of United Nation prospect.
is set to be 53 after 2005. Hence, workers retire after (JW = 22) years of work. The discount factor is set
to β = 1.01286 to match the average aggregate savings rate in China between 1995-2010 (i.e., 42.8%).
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply θ is set to equal to 0.5, in line with the classical estimation in labor
economics (Keane (2011)).
4.3 Labor income
To consistent with the estimated wages of workers with high school education in Ge and Yang (2014),
which is the median level of labor income, urban hourly wages are assumed to grow at the rate of 5.7%
between 1995 and 2013. From 2013 to 2031, the annual growth for this time interval is set to 4.9%. From
2031 to 2040, the annual growth is set to 3.6%. After 2040, to be in line with wage growth in the United
States over the last century, the annual wages grow at 2% per year.
For the human capital variable ηj , it is matched to the average years of education by cohort according
to Barro and Lee (2013) before 1990. We linearly extrapolate ηj for cohorts born after 1990 and assume
that when the average years of schooling reach the current level for the US (i.e., 12), the growth ceases
in the year 2000. Per year of education is assumed to have an annual return of 10%.
We estimate the age-specific productivity {j}JWj=22 it using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) data and the method in Song and Yang (2010) to make it be consistent with the empirical
evidence on gross labor earnings for Chinese urban workers. This implies a 0.5% average annual return
to the age-specific experience.
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For the initial distribution of workers and retirees’ wealth in 1995, due to the missing survey in 1990
in the China Household Income Project (CHIP) and the limitation of CHIP(1988), we have to and can
only set the initial distribution of agents’ wealth in 1990 to be the same as the empirical distribution of
financial wealth in 1995 in the CHIP. We simulate the model throughout the 1990-1995 period given the
initial wealth distribution in 1990 to endogenously obtain the distribution of private wealth in 1995. To
exclude human capital growth, we discount it using an annual wage growth of 5.7%. The distribution of
that entrepreneurial wealth is obtained by assuming that all entrepreneurs are endowed with the same
initial wealth in 1990.
4.4 Technology
The capital share of output α is set to 0.5, which is in line with the estimate in Bai et al. (2006).
The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.1 such that the annual depreciation rate of capital is 10%.
We set the initial level of productivity A0 to 9.6% of US’s GDP per capita in 1995. This yields a GDP
per capita equal to 20% of the US level in 2010, which is consistent with the data. Between 2000-2013,
we set the growth rate of productivity gt so that the model generates an average labor income growth
of 7.5%. After 2013, productivity growth is forecasted by Song et al. (2011) to slow down. Accordingly,
from 2013 to 2040 we linearly interpolate gt to fall to zero. In particular, between 2013 and 2040, China
is expected to grow at a rate of 6.5%. In this case, the GDP per capita in China will be 68% of the US
level by 2040 and remain stable while growing at the long-run world rate thereafter.
For the rural area, we set αr = 0.3 to match the investment rate in the rural area in 1995 data. The
rural wage grows at the rate that can generate the rural-urban wage gap to increase from 1.84 in 2000
to 3.48 in 2040 and stays constant thereafter.
4.5 Pension System
In line with the 1995-1997 pension reform in Sin (2005), we assume that pensioners retiring before 1997
continued to earn a σ1 = 78% replacement rate throughout their retirement. Moreover, those retiring
after 1997 are entitled to a σ2 = 60% replacement rate. In the long-run, i.e., 2030, to balance the pension
fund, we set σ3 = 0.3913 as documented in Song et al. (2015). The reason is as follows. According to
Figure 7, both the UN projection and this paper’s simulation predict a peak of the population at around
2030. Afterward, the population will decline. This will reduce the population who contribute to the
pension system and finally ruin the sustainability of the pension system unless the government lowers
the pension replacement rate. We assume a constant social security tax equal to 20%, in line with the
empirical evidence. The indexation of the average wage is ν = 0.6 according to the pension rule in China.
This paper also takes into account the fact that the current pension system of China only covers a
fraction of the urban workers. The coverage rate has grown from 45% in 2001 to 60% in 2011 according
18
to China Statistical Yearbook 2012. Therefore, the pension coverage rate is assumed to be constant at
60%. Those non-covered workers neither pay the social security tax nor do they receive pension incomes.
The initial wealth of government P0 is set to 0.7% of GDP, matching the 43 billion RMB that is
the cumulative balance of pension fund for urban workers in 1995 according to the National Statistics
Bureau of China.
Table 2 summarizes all parameter values mentioned.
Table 2: Parameters values in the benchmark model
Variable Description Value Source
Preference
β Subjective time discount factor 1.0075 Target average savings rate 1995-2010
θ Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.5 Keane (2011)
ζ Weight of leisure 1 Galindev (2009)
Technology
α Capital labor elasticity 0.5 Bai et al. (2006)
αr Capital labor elasticity (rural) 0.3 Target investment rate (rural) in 1995
δ Depreciation rate 0.1 Bai et al. (2006)
Pension System
τ Social Security Tax 0.20 Pension Rule in China
σ1 Pension Replacement Rate (<1997) 0.78 Sin (2005)
σ2 Pension Replacement Rate (1997-2030) 0.60 Pension Rule in China
σ3 Pension Replacement Rate (>2030) 0.3913 Song et al. (2015)
ν Indexation of average wage 0.6 Pension Rule in China
5 Quantitative Result
In this section, we first construct a benchmark scenario with workers’ early retirement and pension
reform between 1995-1997 to show the validity of this model. Then we consider a set of alternative
scenarios to one-by-one analyze the two major mechanisms (i.e., early retirement effect and wealth
substitution effect) that cause the high saving rates in China.
5.1 The benchmark result
This section shows the benchmark results including mainly the saving rate along the transition path.
Before the initial steady state, a pre-transition simulation has been run to derive the initial steady state
under the two major following assumptions. First, we assume that before 1990 workers supply 1 unit of
labor and consume all the income. Second, before 1980, the wage growth rate was 0; from 1980 to 1995,
the wage growth rate is constant and equal to the wage growth rate in 1980.
In 1995, we shock the initial steady state by both imposing the pension reform and the fact that
workers choose to retire earlier than the mandatory retirement age. In specific, for the early retirement,
being consistent with the data shown in Section 1, the retirement age from 1995 to 1998 is 55, from 1999
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to 2004 it is 54 and the retirement age is set to be 53 after 2005 until the end of dynamic. As for the
pension reform, the pension replacement rate decreases from 0.78 to 0.60 following the pension rule in
China. We use the actual data on the TFP growth rate along the transition path and assume perfect
foresight for all these components.
Since this model does not capture the 2008 financial crisis, to avoid the impact of that crisis, we only
focus and compare the saving rates along the transition path generated by the model to the Chinese
data between 1995 to 2010 to evaluate whether the model is capable of accounting for the rise and the
fall in China’s saving rates. The model that captures the 2008 financial crisis for a longer comparing
period will be further developed.
The results in Table 3 show that the simulated model can match the key variables of China within
the period of concern (1995-2010). The average aggregate saving rate is 42.8% in the data, while in my
model it is exactly the same. The average consumption ratio is 57.1% in the data, while in my model
it is 57.2%. The average aggregate investment rate is 39.2% in my model while the data is 41.2%. The
average capital-output ratio in the data is1.58 while in my model it is 1.54. It is fair to claim that the
results are consistent with the data.
Table 3: Comparison between the model and data
Variable Average Value
Data1 Model
Aggregate Saving Rate (S/Y) 42.8% 42.8%
Consumption Ratio (C/Y) 57.1% 57.2%
Aggregate Investment Rate (I/Y) 41.2% 39.2%
Capital-Output Ratio (K/Y) 1.58 1.54
1The data sources for S/Y, C/Y and I/Y are the World Bank and Chinese Statistics Yearbooks. And the average time
span is from 1995 to 2010. For Capital Output Ratio (K/Y), the data is from Table 1 in Bai et al. (2006). Since Bai et al.
(2006) only estimate up to 2005, the average time span is from 1995 to 2005 for K/Y in Table for both data and model
simulated result.
Figure 7 displays the saving rate generated by the benchmark economy versus the data for the first
18 years along the transition path starting in 1995. Overall, the time series path of the saving rate
generated by the model tracks the data remarkably well. The model not only accounts for the decrease
in the saving rate from 1995 to 2000 but also captures the major increase in the saving rate in the first
ten years in the 21st century. In particular, in the data, as displayed in Table 4, the saving rate gradually
decreased in the first five years in the 1990s, and then increased substantially from 35.8% of GDP in
2000 to 52.3% in 2008 and finally up to 49.6% in 2012. In the benchmark economy, the saving rate was
also decreasing in the first five years in the 1990s and then increased from 37.3% in 2000 to 47.7% in
2008 and finally up to 49.5% in 2012.
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Figure 7: The Chinese Saving Rate: Model vs. Data
Table 4: The Saving Rates Along the Transition Path
1995 2000 2004 2008 2012
Data 39.6% 35.8% 45.8% 52.3% 49.6%
Benchmark model 42.4% 37.3% 44.0% 47.7% 49.5%
Decomposition experiment
1. Early+No Reform 40.9% 35.3% 42.1% 45.9% 47.8%
2. No Early+ Reform 23.0% 25.3% 30.0% 36.1% 41.8%
3. No Early+ No Reform 20.5% 22.6% 27.4% 33.7% 39.7%
5.2 Saving Rate Decomposition Experiments
This section explores the main reasons that drive the saving rates up in China. The findings support
that, the rise in the aggregate saving rates is jointly driven by the early retirement and pension reform in
China in the 1990s. In particular, the younger actual retirement age than the mandatory retirement age
and the reduced pension income due to the pension reform jointly led to the increase in the household
saving rate especially after 2000 as the actual retirement age become younger and younger15.
5.2.1 Counterfactual 1: Early Retirement+ No Pension Reform
To examine the impact of the 1990s pension reform on the saving rates, we simulate a counterfactual
scenario in which the 1990s pension reform is never implemented. In particular, this means that the
15Recalling that we follow the actual data of retirement age and set the retirement age in the model to be 55 from
1995-1998, 54 from 1999-2004 and 53 since 2005.
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pension replacement rate is 0.78 from the beginning to 2030. Figure 8 shows the results of this experiment.
Consistent with our "wealth substitution effect" mechanism, i.e., the pension income can substitute for
the savings that are prepared for the retirement period, the saving rates are slightly lower during the
entire period in this counterfactual economy. This is largely due to the increased pension income that is
caused by the increased pension replacement rate from 0.60 to 0.78 between 1997-2030 compared with
the case in the benchmark model. The 3rd row in Table 4 shows the value of saving rates along the
transition path in this scenario.
Figure 8: The decomposition test of Chinese Saving Rate (Early + No Reform)
5.2.2 Counterfactual 2: No Early Retirement+ Pension Reform
To examine the impact of the early retirement on the saving rates, we simulate a counterfactual
scenario in which the early retirement never happens. In particular, this means that the actual average
retirement age is just exactly the same as the male mandatory retirement age, i.e., 60. Figure 9 shows
the results of this experiment. Consistent with our "early retirement effect" mechanism, i.e., people will
save more in order to cover a longer period over which the accumulated asset will be spread if they retire
earlier, the saving rates are substantially lower during the entire period in this counterfactual economy.
This is largely due to the decline in the saving rate as a result of no need to save more to cover the longer
retirement periods in the benchmark scenario with early retirement (the blue dash line). Furthermore,
comparing this counterfactual scenario (the green dash line) and the benchmark scenario (the blue dash
line) we can observe that, without the early retirement, there is only a smooth and continuous growth
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of the saving rates. Our second finding is that, the early retirement not only contribute to the growth
of the saving rates from 1995 to 2012, but also result in the fluctuation of the saving rates during the
growth. Last but not the least important, when we compare the saving rate in this scenario with the
case of "Early + No Reform" (the green dash line in Figure 8), the “No Early+Reform Model” case
drives down more saving rate than the “Early+No Reform” case. In Figure 8, the lowest point of saving
rate is equal to 35.3% in 2000 as shown in Table 4. However, in Figure 9, the lowest point of saving
rate is equal to 25.3% in 2000 as shown in Table 4. And the saving rates in counterfactual 2 along the
transition path are obviously smaller in the saving rates in counterfactual 1. This means that the "early
retirement effect" has a stronger positive effect on saving rate than the "wealth substitution effect" has.
The 4th row in Table 4 shows the value of saving rates along the transition path in this scenario.
Figure 9: The decomposition test of Chinese Saving Rate (No Early + Reform)
5.2.3 Counterfactual 3: No Early Retirement+ No Pension Reform
To examine the joint impact of the 1990s pension reform on the saving rates, we simulate a counterfac-
tual scenario in which the early retirement never happens and the pension reform is never implemented.
In particular, this means that the pension replacement rate is 0.78 from the beginning to 2030 and the
actual average retirement age is just exactly the same as the male mandatory retirement age, i.e., 60.
Figure 10 shows the results of this experiment. Consistent with our "wealth substitution effect" and
"wealth substitution effect" mechanisms, the saving rates are the lowest in all scenarios during the entire
period and the fluctuation disappears in this counterfactual economy. This is largely due to the decline in
the saving rate as a result of the shorter retirement periods and the increased pension income compared
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to the benchmark case. The 5th row in Table 4 shows the value of saving rates along the transition path
in this scenario.
Figure 10: The decomposition test of Chinese Saving Rate (No Early + No Reform)
For the explanatory power of this model, the change of the saving rate in data from 1995 (39.6%) to
2012 (49.6%) is 25.3% while the change of the saving rate in the benchmark model from 1995 (42.4%) to
2012 (49.5%) is 16.7%. Therefore, the joint effects brought by the early retirement effect and the wealth
substitution effect in China, this model can explain 66.0% (16.7%/25.3%) of the change of the saving
rate in China between 1995-2012.
6 Conclusion
The persistent long-run current high saving rates in China have attracted the attention of scholars
for the past 20 years. However, very few pay attention to the prospect of the fact that workers are
actually retiring earlier than the mandatory retirement age and its interaction with the pension system.
In this paper, we analyze the positive and dominant effects of early retirement and its interaction with
the pension system with the aid of a dynamic model calibrated to China.
A number of existing studies more or less explore the relationship between the pension system reform
and saving rates, saving rates in China (see, e.g., He et al. (2019), İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018a)). Our
analysis concurs with their view that the pension reform in the 1990s does have an impact on the saving
rates and even saving rates in China. We took a further step to explore a new channel that is the early
retirement effect: it would increase the saving rates due to people save more to cover the longer periods
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over which the accumulated asset will be spread. Furthermore, the fact reflected in the data that people
are retiring earlier for the past 20 years drives the saving rates increasing. That could be one of the
necessary reason that China government is gradually postponing the female mandatory retirement age
from 50 to 55 and finally to 60 as the same as the male’s.
The results are subject to some caveats. First, the fact that early retirement has a positive impact on
the saving rates in China. The earlier and earlier average retirement age is one of the major reason that
causes the growing saving rates and fluctuation for the past 20 years. Nevertheless, we do not allow the
agent to retire endogenously while we just use the average retirement age in the data. On the contrary
to the restriction of integer retirement age in this model, the average retirement age is non-integer in
the data. The difference would cause estimation bias. In the future version of this paper, the model
will be extended into a model with endogenous retirement decision. Second, the 1990s pension reform
has a positive impact on the saving rates. However, we don’t follow the pension rule in China before
and after the reform with 100% accuracy. We just follow Song et al. (2015) and İmrohoroğlu and Zhao
(2018a). We do not model the subsequent series of pension reform (e.g., the 2005 pension reform) in this
paper. In the future version of this paper, these two points will be considered into the model. Finally,
we compare the two channels in this paper and find that the early retirement effect has a larger impact
on the saving rates than the 1990s pension reform has. Similar to Song et al. (2015), we abstract from
the crowding out effect of public pensions on within-family old-age care, consider neither idiosyncratic
nor inter-generational risk. We believe that extending the analysis in these directions would not overturn
our main insights.
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Appendix
China’s Pension Reform
Since 1995, China has successively carried out reforms of the social security system in various
provinces. The core content is the implementation of the integration of social pooling and personal
accounts in social security for enterprise employees. At the end of 1997, the State Council promulgated
the “The State Council Document No. 26: Decisions of the State Council on Establishing a Unified Basic
Pension Insurance System for Enterprise Employees” (“Decision 1997”). This reform sets the goal that
the new social security system implements the partial accumulation system through implementation of
the “the integration of social pooling and personal accounts in the pension insurance system.” Besides,
it unifies the conditions for the calculation and payment of pensions.
The specific provisions are as follows: the employees who retired before the implementation of the
“Decision 1997” (the Old) still receive pensions according to the old regulations before the reform, that is,
according to the seniority, they receive 60% to 90% of their standard wages at the time they retire. And
the pension adjustment method is implemented at the same time. For the employees who participated in
the work after the implementation of the “Decision 1997” (the New), if the individual payment period has
accumulated for 15 years, the pension will be paid monthly after retirement. The pension incomes consist
of basic pensions and individual account pension. The monthly standard of the basic pension is 20% of
the average monthly wages of local employees in the previous year. The monthly standard of individual
account pension is the amount of personal savings divided by 120. For the employees who participated
in the work before the implementation of the “Decision 1997” and retired after the “Decision 1997” (the
Middle), if the individual payment period has accumulated for 15 years or can be considered as that the
individual payment period has accumulated for 15 years, their pension incomes consist of three parts:
basic pensions, individual account pensions, and transitional pensions. Therefore, under the new system,
according to the individual’s employment status when the Decision 1997 implemented (retired, employed,
unemployed), the calculation and payment methods of pensions for enterprise employees are different, so
do the pension benefits. On the other hand, the pension benefits of employees of government agencies
and institutions still follow the previous system regulations without adjustment. Table 5 concludes the
main contents of the pension calculation and payment regulations of the enterprise employees before and
after the reform according to the “Decision 1997”.
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Table 5: The pension calculation and payment regulations before and after the 1997 reform
Pension Benefits Pension Tax Rate
Before reform 60% to 90% of their standard According to total wages and local
government wages at the time they retire regulation (Firm); Gradually imple
-mented, less than 3% of wages
(Individual)
After reform
The New Basic pensions (Target to 35% of Firm: 20% of employees’ total wages
the average monthly wages of local Individual: 4% of personal wages (1997),
employees in the previous year) + 8% of personal wages after 1997;
Individual account pensions (balance 11% of personal wages goes to individual
in the account divided by 120; account
target to 24.2%)
The Middle Basic pensions (same as the New) + Same as the New
Individual account pensions (same
as the New) + Transitional pensions
(Indexation of monthly average wages
× Coefficient × Number of years with
-out individual account)
The Old Same as “Before reform” None
Pension adjustment method
is implemented
After 1997, there are several other pension reforms. But these reforms are a merely slight improvement
which is based on the reform in 1997. The primary concerns of these reforms are to widen the coverage
of the pension system and adjust the pension tax rate for the individual account. For example, in
“The State Council Document No. 38: Decisions of the State Council on Improving the Basic Pension
Insurance System for Enterprise Employees” (“Decision 2005”), the pension system includes industrial
and commercial individual and flexible employment personnel. Besides, it reduces the tax rate that goes
to individual account from 11% to 8%. Taxes paid by firm’s do not enter the individual account any
further.
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Demography Change and Current Account Balance in
Emerging Economics: a Re-examination under the General
Equilibrium Condition
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Abstract
This paper, accounting for the facts that the global current account balance must be equal
to zero, re-examines the impact of demographic change on the current account balance. The
method is to design a new empirical specification to introduce the general equilibrium effect
of global current account balance into the framework and use a panel data of the sample of
emerging economies to estimate the relationship between demographic structure and current
account balance under this new framework. The main finding of this paper is that the young
dependency ratio has a robust and significant negative impact on the current account but
the old dependency ratio has an ambiguous and insignificant impact on the current account
under the general equilibrium condition, the latter of which is at loggerheads over with the
traditional literature that finds a negative impact of both young and old population on the
current account balance.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by the observations that emerging economies are in the grips of a rapidly aging
process, which embodies in fewer young population and more old population, the interest in the
macroeconomic effects of demography change has been growing. The demographic change due
to the aging process can have a large influence on many aspects including saving behaviors, la-
bor markets, and investment, consequently leading to a change in the current account balance.
Traditionally, following the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption, young population borrow against
their future income, middle-age population save for relinquishing debts and retirement, and old
population dissaves. From the lens of the current account balance, it is equal to excess saving
over investment. Accordingly, when people become aging, the increased population that dissaves
are more likely to help this country to run current account deficits, which puts pressure on export
and the foreign-exchange earning opportunity. Stemming from Higgins and Williamson (1997) and
Higgins (1998), they find that countries with relatively young populations are capital importers,
whereas the aging population will deteriorate the current account. Following research support this
finding; e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Brooks et al. (2003), Lührmann (2003), Callen et al.
(2006), Gudmundsson and Zoega (2014). However, the existing empirical literature ignores the
general equilibrium condition of the global current account balance, i.e., the current accounts for
all countries sum up to zero1. Given the fact that the current account of each country interacts
with each other in the real world which is following this general equilibrium condition, the neglect
of it will lead to biased estimation coefficients in exploring the impact of demographic change on
the current account balance.
This paper, accounting for the facts that the global current account balance must be equal to
zero, re-examines the impact of demographic change on the current account balance. To achieve
this goal, this paper: first, constructs a simple model to derive the regression model that links the
current account and demography structure variables; second, designs a new empirical specification
to introduce the general equilibrium effect of global current account balance into the framework;
and third, uses a panel data of the sample of emerging economies to estimate the relationship
between demographic structure and current account balance under this new framework. This paper
also investigates whether controlling for the potential endogeneity of demographic changes has a
significant impact on the estimated impact of demographic change on national saving, investment,
and current account. The main finding of this paper is that the young dependency ratio has a
robust and significant negative impact on the current account but the old dependency ratio has an
ambiguous and insignificant impact on the current account under the general equilibrium condition.
1Formally speaking, let CAj denotes the current account of country j at time t. The general equilibrium condition
means that,
N∑
j=1
CAj = 0, where j denotes the country j and N denotes the total number of countries in the world.
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The latter finding is at loggerheads over with the traditional literature that finds a negative impact
of both young and old population on the current account balance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 justifies the roles of demographic variables in the determination of aggregate savings,
investment, and current account balance in a simple growth model with overlapping generations.
Section 4 describes the derivation of the new modeling framework to introduce the general equi-
librium condition. Section 5 illustrates the data and variables selection. Section 6 reports the
regression results. The final section concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is closely related to the strand of the empirical literature on the macroeconomic
impact of demographic change on the current account. Within this literature, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000) empirically studied the impact of changes in the age structure on balances of global savings-
investment balance and found that an aging population deteriorates a country’s current account.
Brooks et al. (2003) found that when baby boomers enter old age, wealth consumption will cause
the Europe Union and the United States to maintain a huge current account deficit. Börsch-Supan
et al. (2004) applied an overlapping generation model based on long-term population forecasts of
seven countries and regions to find that capital initially flows to other countries in the world from
those rapidly aging countries, but when the families begin to use their savings, this trend will
reverse. Callen et al. (2006) used a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium model and found
that if the elderly reduce assets during retirement it will worsen the current account and slow down
economic growth in developed countries. Kim and Lee (2008) adopted the method of panel VAR
model to show that an increase in dependency rate significantly lowers saving rates, especially
public saving rates, resulting in deteriorating current account balances in the G-7 countries. Graff
et al. (2012) used a new framework that adjusts the demographic variables by the difference between
the home country and the rest of world, openness measure, and country size to find that population
aging does not appear to have discernible impacts on the current account balance.
While these studies differ vastly concerning sample coverage, econometric approaches, and
macroeconomic methods, in general, it is fair to summarize that they find that the population that
dissaves tend to have a negative impact on the current account. However, the existing findings as
mentioned above do not consider the condition that the global current account balance has to sum
up to zero. Also, the majority of existing works dwell on the developed countries or the mixed
sample of both developed countries and emerging economies while the works that only dwells on
emerging economies are rare. Through focusing on the sample of emerging economies and taking
3
into account the general equilibrium condition, it is expected to frown upon the existing findings
in the literature.
Another common neglect in these empirical works is that they do not consider the reverse
causality between demographic change and current account surplus. On the one hand, demo-
graphic changes have an impact on the current account through the channel of aggregate saving
and aggregative investment. On the other hand, if there exists a current account surplus in the
emerging economies, the country will have more foreign exchange reserves to purchase advanced
medical equipment, which may lower the mortality rate of the aging population and the neonatal2.
Accordingly, the dependency ratio of this country rises.
Although the aggregate investment is in tandem with the aggregate saving in determining the
current account balance, in contrast to the rich works on the impact of demographic changes
on aggregate saving rates and then on current account balance, the existing works have paid
little attention to the relationship between demographic changes and investment. Only Cooper
(2008) theoretically discusses that the aging population decreases the capital needed to equip
labor. However, no empirical work has been done in testing this argument. Another missing piece
is the increase in capital needed to maintain the same output when the labor supply declines.
Theoretically, in the long term, this will drive up the capital-labor ratio which results in a decline
in the rate of return to capital and finally a capital outflow to chase for a higher rate of return to
capital. Nevertheless, an empirical test on this argument is needed. One of the few studies that
try to involve in this discussion is Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017). One of their empirical findings
is that, rapid aging countries are more likely to adopt robots which can neutralize the negative
effect of labor scarcity. However, the Internation Federation of Robotics (IFR) dataset that is used
in their work only includes 49 countries and most of them are developed countries, which may not
apply in the case in emerging economies and cannot explain the change of capital-labor ratio due
to the aging population.
The last issue merits consideration and, to my knowledge, has not been discussed in the empir-
ical literature on this topic is the endogeneity of labor and demographic changes. The increased
capital-labor ratio not only decreases the rate of return to capital but also increases the wage rate.
The higher wage rate will increase the labor participation rate, which neutralizes the negative effect
mentioned by Cooper (2008). As for the demographic changes, the higher wage rate will drive up
the opportunity cost of having children, prompting residents to delay their childbearing decisions.
This would lead to a declined fertility rate and further exacerbate the problem of population aging.
2Take China as an example, from 1994 to 2017, China has run a current account surplus for 23 consecutive years.
The highest current account as a share of GDP reached 10% in 2007. In the meantime, China’s old dependency rate
(ODEP) increased persistently from 9.1% to 14.8%. According to the WTO‘s report, from 1990 to 2011, the natal
mortality rate has decreased by 62%. According to the World Bank Indicator, the life expectancy has increased
from age 69.293 to age 76.252.
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3 The Simple Model
In this section, a simple life-cycle model is constructed to link old dependency ratio (ODEP),
young dependency ratio (YDEP) to national savings, investment and current account balance and
derive the econometric model for regression. In this simple overlapping generation model, agents
experience three periods in their lives: the childhood period, the working period and the retirement
period. The exogenous fertility rate is set to be nt. The working population is Pt. Accordingly, the
childhood population Pt+1 = Ptnt, nt ∈ (0, 1). The childhood population can survive to working
age with certainty, while the working population can survive to retirement age with probability
Φt. Accordingly, the total population at time t is the summation of all three types of population:
Pt + Ptnt + Pt−1Φt−1.
A middle-aged agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor endowment to work and earns
a wage income of Wt. A retired agent consumes savings St and government transfer Tt. The
government transfer refers to a defined-benefit from a Pay As You Go pension system. Given the
above assumption, the representative agent’s utility maximization problem is as follows,
Max Ut = logMt + βΦtlogOt
s.t.Mt + st = Wt(1− τ)
Ot = Rtst + Tt
Tt =
τWtPt
Φt−1Pt−1
(1)
Where Mt and Ot denote the agent’s consumption in the working-aged and the retirement
period. τ is the social security contribution rate. Rt is the aggregate interest rate. β is the time
discount factor.
The first order condition gives the solution of this simple model as follows,
st = WtΩs,t, Ωs,t =
ΦtβRt(1− τ)− τNtΦt−1
Rt(1 + Φtβ)
(2)
Mt = WtΩm,t, Ωm,t = 1− τ − Ωs,t (3)
Ot = RtΦtβMt (4)
The production function is Yt = AtKαt L
1−α
t . For simplicity, I assume a 100% depreciation
of capital within one period in production. If yt = Yt/Lt denotes the output per worker and
kt = Kt/Lt denotes the capital per worker, the two factor prices are Wt = (1 − α)yt and Rt =
αA(yt/A)
α−1
α .
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The aggregate savings St = Yt −Ct −Gt − δKt. Since there is a 100% depreciation, i.e., δ = 1
and government expenditure is assumed to be 0, i.e., Gt = 0, the aggregate savings St = Yt − Ct.
The aggregate savings as a ratio out of aggregate output is as follows,
St
Yt
=
Ptyt − PtMt − Pt−1Φt1Ot
Ptyt
=1− (1− α)Ωm,t − Pt−1Φt−1
Pt
Ot
yt
=β0 + β1ODEPt + β2Y DEPt
(5)
Where β0 = 1− (1−α)[(1−τ)+τΦtβ]1+Φtβ , β1 = −
(1−τ)(1−α)RtΦtβ
1+Φtβ
, and β2 = − (1−α)τβΦt−1Rt(1+Φtβ) .
As Pt−1Φt−1Pt is the retired population as a ratio out of the working population, it is the ODEP.
According to the definition in the assumption, nt = Pt+1/Pt is both the current fertility rate and
the young dependency ratio (YDEP). Since the current fertility rate is more likely to have an
impact on the future aggregate saving, investment, and current account, I define Nt to be the
YDEP in the baseline model. In the later empirical analysis, a lagged-fertility-rate variable will be
included.
As for the investment aspect, the agents’ savings consist of domestic physical capital kt and
one-period riskless bond of foreign firms bt. That is, st = kt + bt. To be simple, I assume kt
accounts for γ share of st( γ ∈ (0, 1)), i.e.,kt = γst. Accordingly, the aggregate capital Kt = Ptkt
and the aggregate investment It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 = Kt = Ptkt = γPtst. Using (2) we yield,
It
Yt
=
γPtst
Ptyt
=γ(1− α)Ωs,t
(6)
Finally, the current account balance as a share out of GDP using the difference between saving
rates and investment rates as an approximation is as follows,
CAt
Yt
=
St
Yt
− It
Yt
=β′0 + β
′
1ODEPt + β
′
2Y DEPt
(7)
Where β′0 = 1− γ(1− α)(1− τ)− (1−α)[(1−γ)(1−τ)+τΦtβ]1+Φtβ , β′1 = β1 , and β′2 = (1− γ)β2.
The empirical specifications for the current account are based on the theoretical conclusion
Equation (7),
CA
Y i,t
= α0 + α1ODEPi,t + α2Y DEPi,t + α3Zi,t + ui,t (8)
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Where Zi,t is a vector of control variables. According to Equation (7), without considering the
general equilibrium condition, since γ, α, τ, β,Φt ∈ (0, 1) we can expect that the sign of α1 and α2
are negative, which is the finding of most of the existing literature.
4 A New Empirical Framework
In this section, a new empirical framework that captures the general equilibrium of the global
current account balance is introduced, which is an improvement3 to Graff et al. (2012)in an empir-
ical framework that works on the impact of demographic change on the current account balance
in their empirical framework.
4.1 The world sample new framework
The framework starts with dealing with the fixed effect. For a cross-country panel data in this
paper, there exists an unobserved country fix effect, e.g., the country’s specific characteristic, and
time fixed effect, e.g., the financial crisis happened that year.
The general expression following the specification in Equation (8) including the unobserved
country fix effect and time fixed effect for country i at year t is as follows:
CAi,t =βXi,t + i,t
=βXi,t + αi + ft + µi,t
(9)
where Xit is a vector of domestic factors that are expected to affect its current account balance in
the home country . αi denotes the unobserved country fixed effect and ft denotes the unobserved
year fixed effect.
In order to remove these two fixed effects, this paper uses the first difference method as follows.
For the world, the average current account of one country (e.g., the home country i) for all
given time spans is as follows,
¯CAi = βX¯i + αi +
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft + µ¯i (10)
where ¯CAi, X¯i, µ¯i denote the average of the current account, variables of interest, and residual for
all the years of each country respectively. T is the sample size of years.
For the world, the average current account of all countries in the world for each year t is as
3Graff et al. (2012) argue that they want to capture the general equilibrium of global current account balance.
However, under their argument that "if a domestic factor affects the home country’s current account balance, it
must affect the balance for the ROW in the opposite direction", they just use the difference of independent variables
between the home country and rest of world to derive the empirical results. In fact, they do not actually capture
the general equilibrium of global current account balance.
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follows,
¯CAt = βX¯t +
1
I
I∑
i=1
αi + ft + µ¯t (11)
where ¯CAt, X¯t, µ¯t denote the average of the current account, variables of interest, and residual for
all the countries of each year respectively. I is the total number of countries.
For the world, the average current account of all countries in the world for all given time spans
is as follows,
C¯A = βX¯ +
1
I
I∑
i=1
αi +
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft + µ¯ (12)
where C¯A, X¯, µ¯ denote the average of the current account, variables of interest, and residual for
all years and all the countries respectively. I is the total number of countries. T is the sample size
of years.
The equations (9)-(12) yield the following regression model:
(CAit − ¯CAi − ¯CAt + C¯A) = β(Xit − X¯i − X¯t + X¯) + V¯i (13)
where V¯i = µit − µ¯i − µ¯t + µ¯.
Note that under the general equilibrium condition of current account balance, for each year, the
summation of the current accounts of all countries in the world is equal to zero, i.e.,
I∑
i=1
CAi = 0 for
any t. Also,
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
CAi,t = 0. Accordingly, ¯CAi = 1I
I∑
i=1
CAi = 0 and C¯A = 1I
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
CAi,t = 0.
Substituting the conditions refer to ¯CAt = 0 and C¯A = 0 into equation (13) yields the regression
equation for the whole world sample as follows,
(CAit − ¯CAi) = β(Xit − X¯i − X¯t + X¯) + V¯i (14)
The equations (9)-(14) are the first contribution of the specification that captures the general
equilibrium condition of the global current account balance in this paper.
4.2 The new framework for the subsample of emerging countries
Section 4.1 is only true for all countries in the world. This paper aims at examining the impact
of demographic changes in emerging economies. For a sub-sample in the world, equation (9) and
(10) are still true for a developing country i. Since the average of year fixed effect is only related
to the length of time T rather than related to the number of countries I, the average of year fixed
effect 1T
T∑
t=1
ft in equation (10) and equation (12) are the same for both the whole sample, i.e., the
world and the sub-sample, i.e., only the emerging economies. Furthermore, if we always calculate
the average of country fixed effect 1I
I∑
i=1
αi in equation (11) and equation (12) using the whole world
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sample, they are the same. Therefore, the combination of equations (9)-(14) can still exclude the
unobserved country fixed effect and time fixed effect, with the corollary that the regression model
for the sub-sample of emerging economies is as follows,
The equations (9)-(12) yield the following regression model:
(CAit − ¯CAi − ¯CAt + C¯A) = β(Xit − X¯i − X¯t + X¯) + V¯i (15)
where V¯i = µit− µ¯i− µ¯t + µ¯. The difference between this subsample framework and the one in
Section 4.1 is that, in this section, CAit, ¯CAi, Xit, X¯i are for the developing country i only, which
is no longer the whole world sample as in Section 4.1. ¯CAt, C¯A, X¯t, X¯ are for the whole world
which is the same as in Section 4.1.
Also, since ¯CAt, C¯A, X¯t, X¯ are for the whole world in this case, we have CAt = C¯A = 0.
The final regression equation for the sub-sample of developing countries that captures the general
equilibrium of current account balance is as follows,
(CAit − ¯CAi) = β(Xit − X¯i − X¯t + X¯) + V¯i (16)
where CAit, ¯CAi, Xit, X¯i are for the developing country i only. X¯t, X¯ are for the whole world.
The regression model for the whole world in Section 4.1 will also be estimated as a robustness test
and a comparison with the conventional findings.
5 Data and Variables Selection
The object of this paper is the demographic effects on the current account balance. Accordingly,
following common practice (e.g., Higgins and Klitgaard (1998)) in the literature, the dependent
variable is the ratio of the current account to GDP. The explanatory variables of interest are
dependency ratios. The data used here are mainly based on the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators for the period from 1960 to 2017, which cover 93 developing countries. The dataset
contains a wide range of variables, such as the ratio of current account to GDP, the growth rate,
school enrollment, and demographic statistics. Regarding the population age structure, data are
available for the proportions of the population under age 15, between 15 and 64, and aged 65
or above. The age group between 15 and 64 is chosen to be the middle-age population, as in
the literature on savings and dependency rates. The old-age dependency rate refers to those over
middle age relative to the middle-age population, and the total dependency rate is the sum of
those under age 15 and those over middle age relative to the total population. In addition to
these variables, the World Bank dataset also has information on the ratio of the current account
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to output that is of particular interest here.
Again, since the current account is equal to excess saving over investment, three groups of
control variables on life-cycle theory, investment return, and financial environment are employed
in this paper.
The group of control variables on life-cycle theory consists of life expectancy, fertility rate, share
of rural population, labor participation rate, and income growth rate.
As mentioned in the introduction, there exist two opposite effects of the relationship between
age and savings. To better investigate the impact of population aging on saving and current
account balance and following Li et al. (2007), we introduce the Life Expectancy to control the
positive effect that individuals save more when they expect to live longer.
The Fertility Rate is captured by a lagged-fertility-rate variable to partly control for any ef-
fects brought by new-born children. In the literature on empirical growth, most studies use one-
period lagged fertility as an independent variable (see, e.g., Levine and Renelt (1992), Bloom and
Williamson (1998), Islam (1995), and Li and Zhang (2007)). Later we will also experiment by
using 10-year and 15-year lagged fertility variables. The primary results do not change with these
further lags. If the fertility rate increases, the young population who dissaves increases, this will
decrease the current account balance.
The Share of the Rural Population in the total population is included as a control variable
because rural households, especially those in developing countries, may not have as good access to
financial intermediation as their urban counterparts and thus have different saving behavior (See
for instance Graff et al. (2012)). The rural population has less income than the urban population
in general. If the share of rural population increases, the current account is expected to decrease.
The Labor Participation Rate is introduced to control the change of labor participation decision
when investigating the impact of population aging on labor supply, since labor supply is equal to
the product of the quantity of labor force in the labor market and the labor participation rate. If
the labor participation rate increases, the investment is expected to increase, which will decrease
the current account.
It has typically found a positive effect of longevity and thus population aging on growth (e.g.,
Ehrlich and Lui (1991); Barro and Sala-i Martin (1990)). The strong positive effect of longevity on
growth is interpreted by Barro and Sala-i Martin (1990) as a reflection of growth-enhancing factors
(in addition to good health itself ) such as good work habits and high levels of skill. Since we are
studying the impact on current account under the scenario that the population is in transition, it
is necessary to control the Income Growth Rate. The sign of the income growth rate is expected
to be positive due to the positive relationship between income growth and savings.
The group of control variables on investment return consists of human capital and the business
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cycle.
The Primary School Enrollment (of the adult population) is used as a proxy for the human
capital of the middle-age population and is expected to have a positive effect on the current
account by raising the rate of return on savings through human capital (See for instance Barro
and Lee (2000)). The sign is expected to be negative due to the positive relationship between the
human capital and investment.
The GDP gap that is calculated by the relative deviation of annual GDP from potential output,
where the latter is derived by HP-filtering (λ = 100 ) the logged empirical GDP series is used to
control for the business cycle.
The group of control variables on the financial environment consists of financial development,
political stability, and the degree of openness of a country.
The standard proxy for financial development or activity is the money and credit volumes
represented by M2/GDP. It is a common control variable in the open economics literature (See
for instance King and Levine (1993)). It is expected to be negative since a developed financial
environment can help to increase investment and eventually decrease the current account.
The political stability is another important and common control variable in the open economics
literature. Following Graff et al. (2012), for institutional quality and political stability (combined),
we use the Political Risk Index from the International Country Risk Guide. A higher value of this
index implies better institutional quality and higher political stability. It is expected to be negative
due to a stable political environment can help to increase investment and eventually decrease the
current account.
Since the financial openness is associated with international capital flows, the regression should
control for the financial Openness Measure. This variable is taking advantage of the KAOPEN
index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008), which is the first principle component of variable indi-
cating the presence of multiple exchange rates, variable indicating restrictions on current account
transactions, variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions, and variable indicat-
ing the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds that are recorded in the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Using this index instead of a trade
openness measure also has the advantage that it is institution-based and therefore less susceptible
to endogeneity problems and variation due to business cycles. Notwithstanding, we also use a
standard trade openness measure for a robustness check. It is expected to be positive since the
financial openness can catalyze international trade.
The coverage of the panel results from a pragmatic approach. We started with the broadest
cross-section allowed for by data availability; yet to curb sampling effects due to excessive unbal-
ancedness of the panel, we excluded those countries for which data are available for recent years
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only4. Moreover, following common practice in cross-country studies, I disregarded very small
countries5, as their integration into the global economy can be assumed to differ substantially from
larger economies, as well as OPEC countries whose national income derives mainly from exporting
crude oil. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
The correlation matrix of all variables is reported in Table 2.
6 Empirical Result
6.1 The baseline result
The strategy is first to estimate models with only demographic variables, and then to add
a number of control variables group by group to test if the results of the more parsimonious
specifications are robust.
Under the new framework in Section 4.2, we start by estimating the baseline model (16). The
results are reported in Table 3. Figures in parentheses are cluster standard errors by countries.
When only the two demographic variables are included in column (1), the estimated coefficient of
young dependency ratio (YDEP) is negative and significant at the 10% confidence level. Never-
theless, the estimated coefficient of the old dependency ratio (ODEP) is positive and insignificant
at standard levels. Recall that while most of the literature theory that follows the life-cycle theory
finds negative signs for the two demographic variables, a more comprehensive consideration,i.e.,
introducing the general equilibrium condition of global current account balance leads to no conclu-
sive presumption regarding their signs. Accordingly, we assess statistical significance for different
groups of variables for further tests.
In column (2), two more control variables are added, namely, the fertility rate and life ex-
pectancy are added to the model, now young dependency ratio remains the negative sign but
becomes significant at the 1% confidence level. Also, the coefficient of the young dependency ratio
becomes even larger. The old dependency ratio remains insignificant at standard levels while the
sign changes to negative. Thus, interpreting these results mechanically, an increase in the young
dependency ratio by one standard deviation may reduce the current account balance by some 0.3
standard deviations. In what follows, we take this as the baseline model for the sensitivity analyses.
In column (3), the group of control variables that are only related to the life-cycle theory is
introduced, including the income growth rate, labor participation rate, and the rural population
share. This cuts the sample size by nearly one-third. The finding regarding the young dependency
ratio remains the same, albeit that the coefficient is only significant at 5% confidence level.
4This is mainly because these countries became independent entities only recently, particularly after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
5My cut-off is 1 million inhabitants during any year from 1960-2017 as recorded in the World Bank Indicator.
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In column (4), besides the group of control variables that are only related to life-cycle theory,
the pension fund as a share out of GDP is also introduced. This shrinks the sample size to nearly
1/10. The sign of the young dependency ratio remains the same yet insignificant at standard
confidence levels. The coefficient of old dependency ratio continues to be insignificant but the
sign changes to negative. The purpose of this regression is to test whether the channel that the
pension for the retirement period can contribute to the impact of demographic change on the
current account balance in developing countries through the savings channel (i.e., a developed
pension system refers to completed insurance for retirement life, which will decrease the savings.).
However, since the old dependency ratio is insignificance for all four columns till now and the
pension income is not related to the young dependency ratio which is significant in the previous
three columns, this suggests that the effect of the demographic change is actually not the effect of
pension.
In column (5), the group of control variables that contains only the return of investment is
added to the regression, including the primary school enrollment rate and the GDP gap that
captures the business cycle. The finding regarding the young dependency ratio remains the same,
that is, the coefficient is negative and significant at 5% level. The coefficient of the old dependency
ratio continues to be insignificant and positive. Interestingly, when controlling for the factors of
return to investment, the effect of the young dependency ratio becomes much smaller, i.e., the
coefficient changes from -0.3 to -0.221. This suggests that much of the effect of young dependency
ratio changes on the current account balance is actually the investment effect. In other words,
when the demographic changes, it mainly has an impact on the current account balance through
the channel of investment.
In column (6), the group of control variables that are only the proxies of the financial environ-
ment is added to the regression, including the financial development (M2/Y), openness measure,
and the political risk index. The finding regarding the young dependency ratio remains the same,
albeit it is only significant at 10% level. The coefficient of the old dependency ratio continues to
be insignificant and positive.
In column (7), the combination of control variables groups of life-cycle and return of investment
are added. In column (8) the combination of control variables groups of life-cycle, the return of
investment, and financial environment are added. The coefficient of young dependency ratio is no
longer significant at standard levels now but the sign remains negative which is consistent with all
previous regressions. The coefficient of old dependency ratio continues to be insignificant and the
sign remains ambiguous.
Overall, different from the previous studies that tended to find negative effects for both age
dependency ratios in a entire world sample or mixed sample of both developed countries and
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developing countries, even though not all record both of them as statistically significant, the
findings based on the new framework indicate that – after controlling for a reasonable number of
confounders and in the sample of developing countries – only young dependency ratio appears to
have negative effects on the current account balance and it is statistically significant. This would
therefore suggest that the demographic change as a form of the slow down of baby boom indeed
has discernible negative impacts on the current account balance, while a question mark is in order
regarding the change of old dependency ratio as a form of population aging.
6.2 Test with GMM estimation
In this section, a dynamic panel estimation within the new framework is introduced. The
GMM estimation has the following advantages: (1) Considering consumption habits, technological
progress and other factors, there may exist inertia for the current account (Bond (2002)). However,
a dynamic panel model can better identify and reflect the adjusting speed of dependent variables
to a certain extent. (2) Reverse causality: on one hand, the positive impact of export demand
increases the demand for labor on the job market. The higher wage rates from the higher demand
will increase the opportunity cost of having children, prompting residents to delay their childbearing
decisions. This would lead to a declining birth rate and reduce the dependency ratio. On the other
hand, for developing countries, the current account surplus means that the country has more
foreign exchange reserves for the purchase of advanced medical equipment, which may reduce the
mortality of the aging population and the neonatal. The corollary is that the dependency ratio
of a country rises. This section uses the dynamic panel GMM model to avoid the bias caused by
endogeneity and analyze the impact of the inertia of the current account on the current account
surplus as follows:
Yi,t = β0Yi,t−1 + αX˜i,t + i,t (17)
where Yi,t = CAit − ¯CAi, X˜i,t = Xit − X¯i − X¯t + X¯.
Difference GMM (DIF-GMM) (Arellano and Bond (1991)) and system GMM (SYS- GMM)
are two common estimation methods. The characteristics of DIF-GMM estimation is that it first
differentiates the equation in order to remove the impact of fixed effects. Then it uses a set
of lagging independent variables as the instrumental variables of corresponding variables in the
differential equation6.
6However, it is easy for DIF-GMM estimation to be affected by the weak instrumental variables and cause finite
sample errors. It would also lead to a loss of part of the information in the sample. In order to overcome this problem,
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the SYS-GMM estimation. SYS-GMM estimation
combines differential equations and level equations. In addition, it adds a set of lagging differential variables as the
instrumental variables of corresponding variables in level equations. Therefore, SYS-GMM estimation should be
used as a robustness test. System GMM is estimated. However, in the tests so far, there are always too many IVs
than the panel groups, with the corollary that all the estimators are not significant.
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In the following estimation and analysis, due to a large number of observations in the sam-
ple, the estimations are performed using a two-step robust process, as this does not require ho-
moskedasticity of the error term, and the standard errors are corrected for small sample bias
following Windmeijer (2005). Post-estimation Difference-in-Hansen tests are performed to assess if
the DIF-GMM estimators are valid. Both estimators require the first-differenced errors to be seri-
ally uncorrelated, which can be tested post-estimation. The serial correlation test shows that there
only exists first-order serial correlation but no second-order serial correlation in the differentiated
residual.
The results of DIF-GMM are reported in Table 4. All estimations reported in the table pass
the autocorrelation and over-identification tests described above.
As discussed at the beginning of this section, for all columns in Table 3, the young dependency
ratio, the old-age dependency ratio, fertility rate, and life expectancy are treated as endogenous,
meaning that only their second and deeper lags are used as instruments. Yet, using too many
instruments can lead to a downward bias of the standard errors. Therefore, I limit the number
of lags in generating instruments to two, unless the post-estimation diagnostic test results in a
demand for longer lags, as well as “collapsing” the moment conditions.
For column (1), by re-estimating the regression in column (2) of Table 3 using DIF-GMM,
young dependency ratio is once again significantly negative at the 1% level. On the other hand,
the impact of old dependency ratio is still negative and insignificant, as in the other specifications
based on my new framework.
The rest of the columns are a number of robustness tests for the dynamic panel model by
introducing the same groups of control variables as in the baseline estimation. The remaining
variables are treated as exogenous, as they are slowly evolving stock or level variables 7.
For column (2), by re-estimating the regression in column (3) of Table 3 using DIF-GMM, the
group of life-cycle factors is controlled. The young dependency ratio is once again significantly
negative but only at the 10% level. This is probably due to multicollinearity 8.
From column (3) to (6), by re-estimating the regression in column (5)-(8) of Table 3 using
DIF-GMM, the group of investment factors, financial environment factors, the combination of
the first two groups, and the combination of all three groups are controlled. The estimations of
the young dependency ratio are still negative while they are insignificant. This may be due to
7However, in the literature, for example, Graff et al. (2012), the financial development is treated as a predeter-
mined variable, meaning that its first and deeper lags are used as instruments. Furthermore, the labor participation
rate, political risk, GDP gap, and income growth are also treated as endogenous, meaning that only their second
and deeper lags are used as instruments. But for the tests so far, estimating the model with too many instrumented
control variables will lead to the result that all estimations are insignificant.
8However, in Table 2 we can see that, none of the three variables in the life-cycle group, i.e., the LPrate,
Growth_W, and Rural, has a greater than 0.5 correlation coefficient with the YDEP. This is at odds with the
results of further baseline and GMM tests that control for only each one of the three variables in the life-cycle
group. The further tests show that, only controlling for LPrate will reduce the significance of the estimation of
YDEP.
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the potential endogeneity brought by the instruments only using the lags of endogenous variables
themselves, which can be found from only passing the Hansen Test and Difference-in-Hansen tests
of exogeneity of instrument subsets while the Sargan Test is never passed9. In addition, there may
exist multicollinearity when more control variables are added. For example, Table 2 shows that
the correlation coefficient between lagFer and YDEP is 0.75. The old dependency ratio is again
insignificant.
The first two columns show that the results are robust when dealing with the potential reverse
causality. However, for the rest of the columns, due to the potential multicollinearity and the
limitation of the lag variables as the instruments, the coefficients of young dependency ratio become
insignificant. Overall, the coefficients of the young dependency ratio are consistently negative and
significant at only the first two tests in table (4).
6.3 The Whole World Sample Test
In this section, in order to further test the robustness of the baseline result and also compare
the result under the new framework in this paper with the conventional method in the existing
literature, some tests under the new framework using the whole world sample are estimated.
The results are reported in Table 5. All columns are the re-estimation of Table 3 using the
model in equation (14) under the new framework.
There are three main findings of the estimations of the whole world sample. First, similar to the
subsample of developing countries, for the whole world, the young dependency ratio has a significant
negative impact on the current account balance under the general equilibrium condition. Second,
in the whole sample, the impact of old dependency ratio on current account is still ambiguous and
insignificant, which is at loggerheads over the conventional finding following the life-cycle theory
in the existing literature that the both the young dependency ratio and old dependency ratio
which dissave have a negative impact on the current account balance. Third, another interesting
finding in the whole sample estimation is that the lag one-period fertility rate has a significantly
positive impact on the current account balance. The interpretation of this finding is that, the past
baby boom could contribute to the human capital by increasing the population in the labor force
and finally benefit the current account balance. However, the past baby boom will increase the
young dependency ratio which has a negative impact on the current account balance. These two
factors jointly contribute to global imbalances in the world. This finding also casts doubt on the
literature that examines the effect of fertility rate on current account without including the general
equilibrium condition, e.g., Li et al. (2007), which finds the fertility rate has a negative impact on
current account balance.
9Both Hansen Test and Sargan Test are commonly used tests for weak instrument variables.
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7 Conclusion
This paper, accounting for the fact that the global current account balance must be equal
to zero, re-examines the impact of demographic change on the current account balance in the
developing countries. To achieve this goal, this paper: first, constructs a simple model to derive
the regression model that links the current account and demography structure variables; second,
designs a new empirical specification to introduce the general equilibrium of global current account
balance into the framework; third, uses a panel data of the sample of emerging economies to
estimate the relationship between demographic structure and current account balance with this
new framework. This paper also investigates whether controlling for the potential endogeneity of
demographic changes has a significant impact on the estimated impact of demographic change on
national saving, investment, and current account.
Although the details vary from estimation to estimation, as expected, a number of general
observations regarding the demographic effects on the current account balance are in order.
Firstly, for the static models, accounting for general equilibrium, the results based on the new
framework are noticeably different from the conventional finding following the life-cycle theory
in the existing literature that both the young dependency ratio and old dependency ratio which
dissave have a negative impact on the current account balance. At the very least, all previous
estimations based on the conventional framework are biased.
Secondly, the dynamic models, accounting for the inertia of the current account balance and
the endogeneity from the reverse causality, give relatively consistent and robust results for the
impact of YDEP on current account within the new frameworks.
Thirdly, overall, the main finding of this paper is that the young dependency ratio has a
robust and significant negative impact on the current account but the old dependency ratio has an
ambiguous and insignificant impact on the current account under the general equilibrium condition
for not only the developing countries but also the whole world. The latter finding is at loggerheads
over with the traditional literature that finds a negative impact of both young and old population
on the current account balance in the mixed sample with both developing and developed countries.
However, this is not contradictory to the theoretical arguments. This is because population aging
could affect both savings and investment, leaving its effect on excess saving over investment (i.e.
the current account balance) ambiguous. Furthermore, people moving toward retirement may save
more, and retirees may dissave more slowly due to longevity uncertainty. In this regard, it is
plausible for population aging to have either a positive or a negative impact on the current account
balance, or no discernible impacts at all – as found in this study.
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Table 1: Statistics of the Data
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Key variables
Y_CA_Y Current Account 3,006 -.0135593 .0914688
X_ODEP Old Dependency Ratio 8,344 -.0000146 .0154849
X_YDEP Young Dependency Ratio 8,344 .0000903 .0798949
Savings
X_lagFer Fertility Rate 8,243 -.0000535 .0060473
X_Life Life Expectancy 8,236 .0357534 3.081043
X_Growth_W Income Growth Rate 6,751 .0000502 .0506485
X_LPrate Labor Participation Rate 4,004 -1.39e-08 .0223164
X_Rural Rural Population Share 8,576 .0000798 .0393548
Investment
X_PEnroll Primary School Enrollment Rate 5,731 .0007387 .1240423
X_GDPgap GDP Gap 6,827 -.0118911 59.93221
Financial Environment
X_PoliticalRiskIndex Political Risk Index 2,460 .0027806 14.71864
X_M2/Y Financial Development 6,123 -.000514 .1415812
X_open Openness Measure 3,606 -.0020011 .8713569
18
T
ab
le
2:
C
ro
ss
-c
or
re
la
ti
on
T
ab
le
V
ar
ia
bl
es
O
D
E
P
Y
D
E
P
la
gF
er
Li
fe
op
en
G
ro
w
th
_
W
M
2_
Y
LP
ra
te
R
ur
al
P
ol
it
ic
al
R
is
k
P
en
si
on
_
Y
G
D
P
ga
p
P
E
nr
ol
l
H
um
an
C
ap
it
al
s
O
D
E
P
1.
00
0
Y
D
E
P
-0
.1
42
1.
00
0
la
gF
er
0.
24
4
0.
75
0
1.
00
0
Li
fe
-0
.1
91
0.
10
5
-0
.2
06
1.
00
0
op
en
0.
15
0
-0
.1
26
0.
02
5
-0
.0
12
1.
00
0
G
ro
w
th
_
W
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
41
0.
07
5
0.
01
9
1.
00
0
M
2_
Y
0.
23
0
-0
.2
95
-0
.1
00
0.
09
2
0.
02
7
-0
.0
91
1.
00
0
LP
ra
te
0.
06
1
-0
.0
08
0.
04
1
-0
.0
30
0.
10
2
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
47
1.
00
0
R
ur
al
-0
.0
01
0.
05
2
0.
09
0
-0
.1
79
0.
05
1
0.
03
9
-0
.2
45
0.
06
6
1.
00
0
P
ol
it
ic
al
R
is
k
0.
10
6
-0
.0
76
0.
00
3
0.
01
0
0.
09
7
0.
23
4
-0
.0
78
-0
.0
56
0.
17
8
1.
00
0
P
en
si
on
_
Y
-0
.0
30
-0
.1
38
-0
.1
04
-0
.0
07
0.
09
0
0.
16
5
0.
00
1
0.
19
3
-0
.0
84
-0
.0
47
1.
00
0
G
D
P
ga
p
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
10
0.
01
9
0.
03
0
0.
03
8
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
99
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
24
-0
.1
88
1.
00
0
P
E
nr
ol
l
-0
.2
91
0.
28
1
-0
.0
68
0.
31
7
-0
.0
91
0.
01
5
-0
.1
77
-0
.0
58
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
76
-0
.0
34
0.
00
2
1.
00
0
H
um
an
C
ap
it
al
0.
33
7
-0
.4
60
-0
.2
22
-0
.0
74
0.
24
6
-0
.0
19
0.
46
5
0.
02
1
-0
.1
03
-0
.1
09
0.
00
5
-0
.0
13
-0
.3
00
1.
00
0
19
Table 3: Baseline Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y
X_ODEP 0.476∗∗∗ 0.160 0.222 -0.240 0.138 -0.0773 0.209 -0.185
(0.148) (0.195) (0.228) (0.283) (0.201) (0.395) (0.234) (0.444)
X_YDEP -0.138∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.287 -0.238∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.352∗
(0.0695) (0.0894) (0.119) (0.192) (0.0815) (0.172) (0.114) (0.192)
X_lagFer 3.367∗∗ 5.047∗∗ 5.336∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗ 4.565∗∗ 3.469∗∗ 4.351
(1.363) (1.971) (1.746) (1.095) (2.177) (1.648) (2.634)
X_Life 0.00254 0.00373 0.00517∗ 0.00199 0.00190 0.00279 0.00124
(0.00208) (0.00257) (0.00271) (0.00147) (0.00203) (0.00179) (0.00205)
X_Growth_W -0.0380 -0.170 -0.0795 -0.0926
(0.0803) (0.141) (0.0755) (0.0990)
X_LPrate -0.0792 0.254 0.0378 0.204
(0.208) (0.174) (0.131) (0.151)
X_Rural -0.0623 -0.0251 -0.0989 -0.115
(0.115) (0.244) (0.107) (0.187)
X_Pension_Y 0.0502∗∗
(0.0224)
X_PEnroll -0.0458 -0.0597∗ -0.0673
(0.0281) (0.0323) (0.0437)
X_GDPgap 0.000315 0.000408 -0.000140∗
(0.000380) (0.000366) (0.0000774)
X_M2_Y 0.0266 0.0192
(0.0276) (0.0313)
X_open 0.000260 0.00130
(0.00378) (0.00477)
X_PoliticalRisk -0.000561 -0.000551
(0.000449) (0.000558)
_cons 0.000330 0.00113 0.000545 0.0225∗∗∗ -0.0000924 0.00226 -0.000218 0.00108
(0.00408) (0.00412) (0.00487) (0.00699) (0.00410) (0.00578) (0.00459) (0.00591)
N 4271 4175 2962 974 3588 1835 2556 1316
adj. R2 0.026 0.041 0.067 0.076 0.039 0.065 0.079 0.078
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: GMM Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y
L.Y_CA_Y 0.573∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗
(0.0686) (0.0942) (0.0694) (0.0913) (0.105) (0.0956)
X_ODEP -0.353 -0.440 -0.116 -0.0830 -0.386 -0.0763
(0.327) (0.319) (0.386) (0.523) (0.365) (0.704)
X_YDEP -0.296∗∗∗ -0.231∗ -0.178 -0.0888 -0.152 -0.0248
(0.107) (0.129) (0.133) (0.172) (0.187) (0.249)
X_lagFer 5.956∗∗ 6.760∗∗ 2.476 1.680 2.334 0.472
(2.330) (2.936) (2.743) (2.782) (3.805) (5.283)
X_Life 0.00313 -0.000574 0.000758 0.00314 -0.00159 -0.000576
(0.00228) (0.00213) (0.00247) (0.00192) (0.00303) (0.00392)
X_Growth_W 0.0489 0.0520 0.0429
(0.0520) (0.0673) (0.0766)
X_LPrate 0.0860 0.0887 0.0308
(0.127) (0.159) (0.194)
X_Rural -0.143 -0.0661 0.326∗
(0.169) (0.193) (0.178)
X_PEnroll 0.0279 0.0216 0.0235
(0.0228) (0.0293) (0.0309)
X_GDPgap -0.0000761 -0.000231 -0.000308∗
(0.000197) (0.000227) (0.000170)
X_M2_Y -0.0239 -0.0443
(0.0348) (0.0448)
X_open 0.00615 0.00126
(0.00483) (0.00334)
X_Political_Risk_Index 0.000233 -0.00000607
(0.000344) (0.000203)
N 2706 1940 2179 1365 1544 911
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Whole Sample Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y Y_CA_Y
X_ODEP 0.0964 -0.196 0.00490 -0.685 -0.219 -0.570 0.0594 -0.804
(0.245) (0.341) (0.394) (0.435) (0.369) (0.682) (0.430) (0.811)
X_YDEP -0.145∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.281 -0.221∗∗ -0.331∗ -0.184 -0.332
(0.0763) (0.103) (0.141) (0.170) (0.106) (0.185) (0.140) (0.237)
X_lagFer 2.587 2.393 4.246∗∗ 1.317 2.172 0.682 2.533
(1.763) (2.455) (2.068) (1.440) (2.363) (1.907) (2.970)
X_Life 0.00275 0.00242 0.00131 0.00248 0.00168 0.00186 0.00126
(0.00225) (0.00279) (0.00235) (0.00157) (0.00200) (0.00181) (0.00212)
X_Growth_W 0.0239 0.0514 -0.0293 -0.0517
(0.0882) (0.190) (0.0854) (0.112)
X_LPrate -0.190 0.165 -0.00407 0.162
(0.280) (0.199) (0.162) (0.155)
X_Rural -0.225∗ -0.280 -0.209∗ -0.250
(0.116) (0.224) (0.124) (0.184)
X_Pension_Y 0.0444
(0.114)
X_PEnroll -0.0607∗∗ -0.0681∗∗ -0.0659
(0.0298) (0.0329) (0.0444)
X_GDPgap 0.000431 0.000554 -0.0000946
(0.000394) (0.000412) (0.0000660)
X_M2_Y 0.0192 0.00710
(0.0416) (0.0485)
X_open -0.00147 0.000632
(0.00391) (0.00518)
X_PoliticalRisk -0.0000147 0.000106
(0.000471) (0.000604)
_cons -0.0117∗∗ -0.0111∗∗ -0.0133∗∗ 0.00862 -0.0119∗∗ -0.0105∗ -0.0131∗∗ -0.0136∗∗
(0.00461) (0.00463) (0.00621) (0.00854) (0.00482) (0.00546) (0.00568) (0.00646)
N 2967 2911 2069 387 2478 1445 1748 1028
adj. R2 0.015 0.025 0.040 0.079 0.046 0.043 0.078 0.080
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Abstract
This paper studies the role of early retirement and pension system reform as drivers of China’s
persistent high savings and current account surplus with the aid of a dynamic model calibrated to
China. In the model, by incorporating the fact of early retirement and the feature of the pension
system in China, the dominant early retirement effect coupled with the wealth substitution effect can
increase the household’s savings, which results in high saving rates in China. The current account
surplus is due to the high savings and the domestic firms have financial borrowing friction to access
domestic investment. The earlier and earlier actual retirement age finally results in the growing
saving rates and current account surplus under the restriction of domestic investment.
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1 Introduction
Since the “Reform and Opening” policy was launched in 1978, China’s economic and social develop-
ment has achieved remarkable unprecedented changes, one of which is the large and persistent external
imbalances (Figure 1). China has run a current account surplus since 1994 and, by 2016, it had ac-
cumulated a net foreign asset which amounted to 35.4%1 of its GDP. A classical open-economy model
predicts a large net capital inflow rather than an outflow in developing countries whose has the high
domestic return to capital. However, in the case of China, which has experienced a growing current
account surplus, the combination of high growth and a high return to capital and a growing foreign
surplus is puzzling.
Figure 1: Current account balance of China
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook
In addition, China has undergone a spectacular economic transformation involving not only fast
economic growth and sustained capital accumulation, but also major shifts in different systems, for
example, the social security system. The gradually implemented pension system reform from 1995 to
1997 changed the pension system in China from a pure Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) to a combination of
both PAYG and Fully Funded (FF). This is the very time when China’s current account turned surplus.
This is not coincident. With the reform of the pension system, which is highly related to the income of
retirement, the behaviors of consumption, saving and investment of households will change during both
the working period and the retirement period, which contributes to the change of current account.
1Data source:World Bank national accounts data,International Monetary Fund and author’s calculation.
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China also sets up a much earlier mandatory retirement age2 than other countries with a similar life
expectancy and allows for early retirement.3 Under this circumstance, what accompanies the process
of the pension reform is a noteworthy phenomenon that Chinese people choose to retire earlier than
the mandatory retirement age. In addition, the average retirement age is trending lower constantly.
According to the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) and China Labor-Force Dynamics Survey
(CLDS), the average retirement age surged from 53 to 57 in the 1980s. Afterward, it has decreased from
age 57 in 1992 persistently to about 54 in 2004. Finally, the average retirement age remained relatively
stable at around 53 from 2005 to 2015 (Figure 2). Another evidence of the fact that people are retiring
earlier is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 exhibits the labor force participation rates of different older groups
in China in 2000 and 2010. The male labor participation rate nearly remains unchanged from 2000 to
2010 for the male before the male mandatory retirement age. But it declines substantially for age 60+
group from 2000 to 2010. The female labor participation rate has the greatest decrease among the age
50-54 group while the rest groups quit the labor market more than those in 2000. These facts can offer
potential channels of the early retirement and pension system to explain the high savings and current
account surplus in China.
Figure 2: Average retirement age in China
Source: CHNS and China Labor-force Dynamic Survey(CLDS)
2Age 60 for male workers and age 50 for female worker. For female government officials, the retirement age is 55.
3The retirement policy in China is that, according to the State Council Provisional Regulations on Retirement and
Resignation of Workers, if they have worked for more than ten years, male employees should retire at age 60, female
employees should retire at age 50 and female cadres should retire at age 55. In the heavy labor and high-risk industries,
for example, the mining industry, male should retire at 55 and female should retire at 45. If employees lost the ability to
work which is proven by hospitals, male should retire at 50 and female should retire at 45.
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Figure 3: LFPR in Different Age Groups in China
Source: 2000 population census and 2010 population census
There are already some explanations for the high saving rates and current account surplus in China
from different perspectives including consumption-smoothing theory, culture, demographic change, pen-
sion system and uncertainties. However, there are different shortcomings and the findings are inconclu-
sive. The details of these imperfections in the existing literature are discussed in the next section.
While being consistent with salient qualitative and quantitative features of the Chinese experience,
this paper suggests that early retirement and pension system reform had a large impact on mainly the
savings. Since China has an earlier retirement age and also allows for early retirement, in the life-cycle
model of this paper, these facts cause Chinese households to increase saving in order to cover the longer
period of the retirement periods over which accumulated assets will be spread. In addition, the financial
friction in the banking sector causes China’s firm cannot fully access to the banks’ loan. This decreases
the domestic investment rate. The difference between saving and domestic investment finally contributes
to the large current account surplus. The impact of this channel appears quantitatively large, and the
model predicts a positive current account balance for China for the majority of the simulation period.
Earlier research (e.g., Gourinchas and Rey (2014)) on external imbalances based on the basic neo-
classical theory has focused on the industrialized world, and struggled to explain the capital flows from
fast-growing emerging economies to industrialized countries, including the capital outflows from China.
Yet, the implications for global imbalances of the fact that East Asian countries save more to finance
old age consumption because of their poor PAYG systems are still unexplored. In addition, there have
already been some possible explanations for this global imbalances from different perspectives includ-
ing the structure of trade and specialization patterns (e.g., Jin (2012)), privatization of state-owned
enterprises, (e.g., Song et al. (2011)), non-traded sector, (e.g., Rothert and Short (2016)), fertility and
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longevity or one child policy (e.g.,Bárány et al. (2016), İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018)), large-scale eco-
nomic reform, (e.g., Buera and Shin (2009)), etc.. However, this strands of literature puts more emphasis
on the underdevelopment of financial markets in the emerging economies and their inability to supply
safe assets has caused the flight of capital from the emerging markets, while less emphasis on explaining
the observed high household savings and both the urban and rural household economic behaviors. In
addition, a strand of literature has shown that PAYG can substitute for savings, but why the saving
in China with a PAYG pension system is still so high remains unexplained. One of the answers could
be the PAYG pension system is underdeveloped which is hard to sustain the same consumption level
after retirement. However, other important factors remain to be explored. If people retire earlier, either
required to (i.e., mandatory retirement) or choose to (i.e., voluntary retirement), they have to increase
their saving in order to support the longer retirement with fewer pension benefit. This is the so-called
"induced retirement effect" proposed by Feldstein (1974).
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new explanation (i.e., the early retirement)
for the persistent external imbalances in China. The paper is related to the literature using life-cycle
models to analyze external imbalances, population aging and social security, but also more generally to
the literature on external imbalances between emerging and industrialized economies. We go one more
step to explore the effect of early retirement coupled with the pension system. This paper also relates
to existing work on pension system and economic growth such as Feldstein (1974), Kotlikoff (1996),
Docquier and Paddison (2003), Kaganovich and Meier (2012) and so on, which focus mostly on the pure
PAYG system in developed countries. In addition, the model tries to capture the induced retirement
effect and the wealth substitution effect proposed by Feldstein (1974), which, to my knowledge, is the
first time. Finally, this paper differs from the literature which studies China’s capital outflows that do
not take into account the difference between urban and rural regions. This paper constructs detailed
demographic and pension system models that capture both the urban and rural feature in China.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
presents the model. Section 4 parameterizes the model and calibrate it to the data. Section 5 presents
the results and dynamic analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is mainly related to the body of literature which puts emphasis on pension system as
the main determinant of global imbalances. Samwick (2000) uses cross-sectional evidence to prove
that countries with PAYG systems tend to have lower saving rates. Eugeni (2015) investigates the
relationship between East Asian countries’ high propensity to save and global imbalances in a two-
country OLG model where only one of them has the pension system. This paper shows that the high
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saving behavior of emerging economies and capital outflows to the United States can be attributed to
their poor PAYG social security system. Different from the traditional context of perfect foresight, full
information, and in a time-consistent manner, Börsch-supan and Härtl (2017) sheds light on selected
aspects of pension economics in Asian economies including the volume of savings for old-age provisions,
international diversification of retirement savings, and global spillover effects of pension reforms when
households are myopic and time is inconsistent. They find that the volume of savings for old-age provision
is substantially lower in a world with many myopic households, which a substantially lower contributes
to international capital flows. Niemeläinen (2017) uses a life-cycle model to study the role of population
aging and the low level of pension income in retirement as drivers of China’s persistent trade surplus
vis-a-vis the United States. The model shows that the fast increase in life expectancy coupled with
the relatively low pension expenditures can contribute to its high savings, the persistent trade surplus
and the accumulation of a sizeable net foreign asset position.İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018) argue that
inadequate insurance through government programs for the elderly and the decline in family insurance
due to the one-child policy led to an increase in the household saving rate. The increase in the saving
rate coupled with the financial frictions preventing the increased household saving from being invested
in domestic firms resulted in large current account surpluses. Yet, the literature ignores the urban and
rural features which are highly related to the difference between the urban and rural pension system in
China.
The interaction between the pension system and other factors, e.g., demographic changes, etc, is
another strand in the literature. Saarenheimo (2005), Domeij and Martin (2016) and Bárány et al.
(2016) use multi-period OLG models to analyse questions related to external imbalances, population
aging and social security in a multi-country setting. In specific, Saarenheimo (2005) studies the effects
of population aging on global variables including the real interest rate, asset prices and external imbal-
ances in a 73-cohort OLG model with five countries. Domeij and Martin (2016) analyze the effects of
demographic transition on the international capital flows in a model economy consisting of 18 OECD
countries and the rest of the world. Bárány et al. (2016) analyze the role of demographic change together
with credit constraints and social security on external capital flows in a multi-country setting. Ferrero
(2010) analyses the effects of demographics, fiscal policy and productivity on the external balance be-
tween the US and six other industrialized countries. The main finding is that productivity differentials
together with demographic developments can explain the majority of the dynamics of the bilateral trade
balance between these industrialized countries during the simulation period (1970-2005). However, if the
model is extended to include China, the predictions are counterfactual, which remains to be explored.
Furthermore, the interaction between pension system and other possible factors, e.g., the retirement age
that is going to be the main concern in this paper, remains unexplored.
Recent literature on external imbalances in China typically highlights the role of financial markets.
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Caballero et al. (2016) develops a model which rationalizes the international capital flows as a global
equilibrium outcome driven by differences in different regions’ abilities to supply financial assets. Also
Mendoza et al. (2009) argues that when countries with less developed financial markets, resulting in low
enforceability of financial contracts, integrate to the international financial system, capital flows towards
more developed financial markets occur. Song et al. (2011) proposes a model for the Chinese economy
in which the firms are heterogeneous in productivity and in access to the financial markets. The capital
outflows occur because the productive firms have limited access to financial markets, and therefore the
domestic financial markets are unable to provide sufficient investment opportunities to the households
despite high productivity growth. Different from the emphasis on financial markets, this paper gives
more weight on the new explanation of high savings in China than frictions in financial markets. The
friction in financial markets in this paper is a tool to sustain the higher rate of return to capital of firms
and help the high savings outnumbers the domestic investment.
The last strand of related literature is about the contribution of endogenous retirement and pension
system on savings. Sánchez Martín (2010) assesses the pension reform in the Spanish economy whose
major policies include delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits.
They find that low-skilled workers tend to retire early and average-skilled workers anticipate retirement.
In addition, the pension reform extends the length of the averaging period in the pension formula,
which reduces the size of pension benefits and finally leads to higher levels of personal savings and
capital accumulation. Fehr et al. (2003) investigates five different reform proposals by means of an
overlapping generations model with endogenous retirement age and heterogeneous individuals for the
Norwegian economy. This paper finds that the expansion of their social security systems has discouraged
labor market participation in general and induced early retirement. The majority of households still
keep early-retiring, resulting in that the pension benefits are reduced and people increase their savings.
Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2017) studies the 2011 and 2013 reforms of the Spanish public pension
system and finds that Spanish pension systems which include important non-actuarial benefits encourage
early retirement. The reforms by means of delaying the legal retirement ages finally lead to an increase
in the duration of the working lives, the aggregate effective labor and savings due to lower retirement
pensions. However, the reforms studied in this strand of literature manipulate the mandatory retirement
age, while the pension reform in China from 1995 to 1997 did not. Furthermore, early retirement in
China is not mainly due to pension reform. For example, Feng et al. (2008) uses the China Health and
Nutrition Survey to find that the lay-off in the 1990s is the main cause of early retirement in the 1990s
in China. Thereafter, this paper is not going to explain the reason for early retirement in China. We
just take the early retirement as given, and explore its impact on the saving rates and current account.
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3 Model
In this section, we present a multiperiod life-cycle model for our analysis of China’s saving, investment
and the current account. The model consists of conventional workers and the firms that share similar
features to the entrepreneurial firms in Song et al. (2011). A period in the model stands for one year
of real time, which is denoted by t when referring to calendar time and by j when referring to age.
We model the agents from their born to death, which will be further discussed in section 4.1, but the
representative agents only have an impact on the economy when they enter the labor market at age 224,
work until age JW , and live up to age J¯ . Many cohorts are included in the model. The economy in
this model begins in 1995.5 Different cohorts enter in the year 1995 with different starting ages. Agents
are assumed to be either workers or entrepreneurs. Workers earn labor income during their working
years, make exogenous retirement decision before or at the mandatory retirement age and receive social
security after they retire. There is no private insurance market and the annuity markets are closed
as assumptions. The entrepreneurs are the residual claimants of the firm’s profits. We assume that
entrepreneurs are not in the pension system. The entrepreneurs work as managers for JE − 22 years and
earn managers income. They retire as entrepreneurs by investing their lifetime managers income to run
the firm at age JE + 1. More discussion of entrepreneurs will be elaborated in Section 3.2.
This model abstracts from some potentially important features. First, the model considers neither
idiosyncratic nor intergenerational risk. Even though these two risks are important, it is difficult to insure
in emerging economies. Second, the model ignores within-cohort inequality since public pensions can also
provide some intragenerational redistribution. Last but not least important, we do not consider altruism
within families as in, e.g., İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018). The reason is supported by Cai et al. (2006),
who argue that the fact that elder people receive transfers from their children in response to negative
income shocks happens mainly in urban China rather than pervasive in both urban and rural areas.
Furthermore, they also empirically find that such transfers can only provide very limited insurance.
3.1 Worker’s Problem
The life-time utility function of the representative agent at time t is as follows,
Ut =
J¯∑
j=0
βjsju(ct,j , ht,j) (1)
where β stands for a time discount factor, sj is the unconditional probability of surviving till age j
for an agent and sj =
j∏
i=1
ψi. ψi is the conditional survival probability from age j − 1 to age j. ct,j
denotes the consumption and ht,j denotes the labor supply.
4Chinese teenagers generally enter college at 18 and graduate at age 22.
5There are two reasons to choose 1995 as the beginning year of this model. First, China’s pension system reform started
to implement between 1995-1997. Second, China’s current account started to increase in 1995.
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The utily function is as follows,
u(ct,j , ht,j) = log(ct,j)− ζ
h
1+ 1θ
t,j
1 + 1θ
(2)
The budget constraint for a representative worker (j ≤ JW ) is as follows,
ct,j + at+1,j+1 = (1 + rt)at,j + (1− τt,j)wtjηjht,j (3)
where at+1,j+1 is the asset holding for the next period, and rt is the domestic saving interest rate. τt is
the labor income tax and wt is the wage rate. j is the deterministic age-dependent productivity at age
j. ηj represents the human capital at age j.
In addition, since there is no private insurance market, each individual has to self-insure the risks she
faces through asset accumulation. In any period t, a retired individual of age j (JW + 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯) faces
the following budget constraint,
ct,j + at+1,j+1 = (1 + rt)at,j + pt,j (4)
Following Song et al. (2015), pt,j , the pension received at period t + j by an agent who worked until
period t + JW (and who became “adult” in period t) is computed as follows:
pt,j = σt+JW [νy¯t+JW + (1− ν)y¯t+j−1] (5)
where j > JW ; ν measures the importance of indexed average wage in the determination of social
security benefits; and σt denotes the replacement rate in period t and y¯t is the average pre-tax labor
earnings for workers in period t:
y¯t ≡
JW∑
j=0
µt−jwtsjt−jηt−jht−j,t
JW∑
j=0
µt−jsj
(6)
where µt−jsj is the number of agents of cohort t-j (i.e., who became economically active in period t-j)
who have survived until period t. In particular, µj is the population of age j at year t. j is the survival
probability from age j to age j+1. The numerator in equation (7) is the total pension contribution from
the working population at year t. And the denominator in equation (7) is the total working population.
This fraction represents the "Average Indexed Monthly Earnings" (AIME) of average wage at time t,
which is consistent with the pension reform regulation.
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3.2 Entrepreneur’s Problem
In this section, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model that delivers the wage and interest
rate sequence.
The rural production sector is a traditional production sector that chooses capital and labor to
maximize a Cobb-Douglas production function Yr = Kαrr (ArNr)1−αr . Where αr is the capital-labor
elasticity, Kr and Nr are the effective capital and labor input, Ar is the productivity. The optimizing
condition implies that wr = (1− αr)( KrArNr )αr and rr = αr( KrArNr )αr−1 − δ.
The urban production sector is in the spirit of the E-type firm in Song et al. (2011). The urban
entrepreneurs delegate the management of their firms to specialized agents called managers, which can run
more productively than rural firms. Nevertheless, the urban firms are subject to credit constraints which
the rural firms do not. The production function function of an urban firm is Yu = Kαuu (χAuNu)1−αu
where χ > 1 denotes the extra efficiency units per worker.
In the following section, for the sake of simplicity, the subscript of urban u is omitted when discussing
urban production sector while the the subscript of rural r will still remain in case of causing confusion.
The optimization problem of an urban entrepreneur is to maximize profits subject to the incentive
constraint for managers and borrowing constraint as follows,
max
Mt,Nt
Ξt(Ωt) = K
α
t (χAtNt)
1−α − (ρt + δ)Kt −Mt − wtNt (7)
s.t. Mt ≥ ψKαt (χAtNt)1−α (8)
and
(1 + rlt)Lt ≤ ξ[χKαt (AtNt)1−α + (1− δ)Kt − wtNt] (9)
Where ξ is the parameter that measures the financial friction. The technology parameter At grows at
the exogenous rate gt. Kt = Ωt + Lt. Ωt is the entrepreneur’s own capital stock; Lt is the loan she
borrows from the domestic bank with domestic interest rate rlt. ψ < 1 denotes the share of output that
received by managers.
The optimal contract implies that the incentive constraint is binding:
Mt = ψK
α
t (χAtNt)
1−α (10)
The firm’s optimization of equations (7), (8) and (9) imply that the wage rate wt, and the net return
to capital ρt, are given by
wt = (1− α)(1− ψ)χ1−α( Kt
AtNt
)α (11)
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ρt = α(1− ψ)χ1−α( Kt
AtNt
)α−1 − δ (12)
Substituting the equation Kt = Ωt + Lt, (11) and (12) into equation (9) yields,
(1 + rlt)Lt ≤ ξ(1 + ρt)(Ωt + Lt) (13)
In this paper, the firm’s credit constraint is always binding, from equation (13) the loan of the firm
is given by,
Lt =
ξ(1 + ρt)
1 + rlt − ξ(1 + ρt)
Ωt (14)
3.3 The life-time problem
The life-time maximizing problem of workers is as follows,
max Ut =
J¯∑
j=0
βjsj(log(ct,j)− χ
h
1+ 1θ
t,j
1 + 1θ
)
s.t.
J¯∑
j=0
sj
Rj
ct,j =
JW∑
j=0
sj
Rj
(1− τt,j)wtjηjht,j +
J¯∑
j=JW+1
sj
Rj
pt,j
(15)
Standard analysis yields the first-order conditions:
ct,0 = λ
−1 (16)
ct,j = λ
−1βjRj = (βR)jct,0, forj ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, (17)
ht,j = (
wt
ct,j
)θ, forj ∈ {1, 2, ..., JW }, (18)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
The agent with entrepreneurial skill work as a manager until age JE and earn the management income
Mt. And during this time can only invest her savings in bank deposits (as can workers) which yields an
annual gross return Rt = rlt. As she reaches age JE + 1, she retires to become an entrepreneur. In this
case, she invests her life-time accumulated wealth in her own business yielding the annual return RE,t
and hire managers and workers. Thereafter, she becomes the residual claimants of the firm’s profits. We
assume that entrepreneurs are not in the pension system. Their lifetime budget constraint is then given
by
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JE∑
j=0
sj
Rj
ct+j +
J¯∑
j=JE+1
1
RJE
sj∏t+j
v=t+JE+1
RE,v
ct,j =
JE∑
j=0
sj
Rj
Mt (19)
3.4 Government
The government taxes the labor income to finance the pension system. Given an initial pension trust
fund, P0, the government intertemporal budget constraint is as follows,
P0 +
∞∑
t=0
1
Rt
(τt
JW∑
j=0
µt−jwtsjt−jηt−jht−j,t) ≥
∞∑
t=0
1
Rt
(
J¯∑
j=JW+1
µt−jsjt−j,t) (20)
where the left hand side of the constraint is the pension contribution from the working population;
the right hand side of the constraint is the pension payment to the retired population.
3.5 Current Account
In the competitive equilibrium of the open economy setting, the current position of the net foreign
assets is equal to the difference between private savings deposited in the bank account and bank loans
borrowed by the domestic firms plus the difference between government saving and investment. That is:
NFAt = (S
g
t − Igt ) + St − Idt (21)
CAt = NFAt −NFAt−1 (22)
where the private savings deposited in the bank account St is equal to the entrepreneurial agents’
(i.e.,managers) savings plus both urban and rural workers’ savings. The bank loans Idt = Lt borrowed
by the domestic firms is equal to the rural firms’ capital and the urban firms’ capital excluding their
own capital stocks. The government savings Sgt and investment I
g
t is not endogenously determined in
the model, which will be elaborated in the calibration of the government sector.
4 Calibration
4.1 Demographics
This section describes and parametrizes the demographic model similar to Song et al. (2015) in this
paper.
China faces a major demographic transition not only in the form of the population growth but
also the internal rural-urban migration. This demographic transition interacts with the function and
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sustainability of the pension system and saving-investment behaviors. Therefore, we construct in this
section a detailed demographic model. We model both the exogenous population growth and rural-
urban migration by: first, a model without internal rural-urban migration; second, an extended model
of migration with fixed age-gender-specific emigration rates over time.
4.1.1 Population projections without rural-urban migration
We first start with a model without rural-urban migration. The initial population is classified ac-
cording to their birthplaces, ages, and genders. Under the no-rural-urban migration framework, we take
advantage of the initial population size and distribution from the adjusted 1995 census data, to project
the population in 2000. And the projected 2000 population is targeted to the adjusted 2000 census data.
Regardless of the mentioned time span issue, another reason for this is that, there is a consensus among
economists6 that birth rates have been underreported in Chinese census data, causing a downward bias
of the census data. Take the 2000 census as an example, Zhai and Chen (2007) use the primary school
enrollment rate to adjust the census data and find that there is a deficit of 29.67 to 37.83 million age
0 to 9 children in the 2000 census. To heed this concern, for the 1995 census, we take the rural-urban
population and age-gender distribution from the 1995 census and adjust the data with the subsequent
National Bureau of Statistics(NBS) revisions. For the 2000 census, we not only take the same variables
from the 2000 census with the same revisions but also adjust this according to the linear estimates in
Zhai and Chen (2007), which is to calculate the missing number of children of each age group and add
them to the data.
For the mortality rates in the population projection, the general idea is that, we first take the initial
group-specific mortality rates from data, and then set the mortality rates to match some specific years
in the future. Finally, in the long run, the mortality rate is fixed. In particular, the initial group-specific
mortality rates are derived from the 1995 census. The life expectancy at birth in the initial year is
70.8 years, which is close to the World Development Indicator figure in the same year (70.2). The three
specific years are chosen to be 2020, 2050, and 2080. The mortality rates chosen for these three future
years can match the demographic projection until 2080 by Yi (2007). We use linear interpolation over the
intermediate periods. After 2080, the mortality rate is assumed to be fixed. This can imply a long-run
life expectancy of 81.9 years.
For the choice of fertility rates, we follow the same logic as the choice of mortality rates. The
initial group-specific (urban and rural) fertility rates for 1995 and 2000 are taken from the 1995 one-
percent population survey and the 2000 census, respectively. We interpolate linearly the years 1996-1999.
Between 2000 and 20127, we assume age-specific fertility rates (urban and rural) to be the same as the
6Mi (2004), Zhang (2005), Zhai and Chen (2007), etc.
7The reason to cut off this time span is that, in 2013, the third plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Party
Congress announced the plan allowing couples to have two children if one of them is an only child, which was rapidly
implemented by provinces.
13
2000 level. The average urban and rural total fertility rates (TFR) are 1.2 and 1.988 in the projection,
respectively. Between 2013 and 2050, to be consistent with the claim of the Chinese authorities, as
outlined by the National Health and Family Planning Commission9 and the estimation in Yi (2007)10,
we assume age-specific fertility rates in the rural area to remain constant, i.e., 1.98 and age-specific
fertility rates in the urban area to be 1.811. After 2050, the long-run TFR is assumed to be 2.0766
following the United Nations population forecasts. In particular, we linearly interpolate the TFRs for
the years 2051-2099 from 1.98 to 2.08 in the rural area and from 1.8 to 2.08 in the urban area to smooth
the demographic change.
4.1.2 Population projections with rural-urban migration
In the rapid process of industrialization and urbanization in China, a large scale of the rural population
migrates to the city, which will have a profound impact on both the rural and urban population structure.
If we use the place of permanent registered residence (i.e., Hukou) as a classification standard, there are
mainly two categories of rural-urban migrants12. The first category consists of people who physically
move from rural to urban areas but retain a rural Hukou. We call it the Floating Population. The second
category comprises people who change their Hukou from rural to urban even they do not physically move
to cities. We call it the Permanent Population. The sum of the two categories is called the net migration
flow (NMF).
Generally, it is difficult to estimate and predict the rural-urban migration, even for developed coun-
tries. The pervasive legal and administrative regulations in China compound this problem. Although
emigration rates are likely correlated with a series of factors including the urban-rural wage gap, pension
and health care entitlements for migrants, the rural old-age dependency ratio, and so on, we have to
and can only abstract from these factors and assume that the demographic migration only depends on
the age distribution of rural workers. Accordingly, in this simple model of migration, we assume that
the age-gender specific emigration rates that are estimated from the 1995-2000 population projection
are fixed over time. To incorporate rural-urban migration in our population projection, we make two
assumptions. First, the age-gender-specific migration rates remain constant after 2000 at the level of
our estimates for the period 1995-2000. Second, once the migrants have moved to an urban area, their
fertility and mortality rates are assumed to be the same as those of urban residents.
The general idea to estimate the NMF and the age- and gender-specific distribution and use these as
the backbone of the projection of migration. We first use the 1995 census to construct a projection of
8The estimated value from the 2000 census and earlier surveys are between 1.5 and 1.8 (see, e.g., Zhang and Zhao,
2006).
9Source: Xinhuanet November 15, 2013
10Yi (2007) estimates that the second-child policy would increase the urban TFR from 1.2 to 1.8 (the second scenario in
Yi (2007)).
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12The difference is significant since most non-resident workers are currently not covered by any form of urban social
insurance including pensions.
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the rural and urban population without migration until 2000 based on the method described in section
4.1.1. We then estimate the age- and gender-specific distribution by taking the difference between the
2000 projection of the population without migration and the actual population in the data according to
the 2000 survey.
4.1.3 Results for the population projection
According to our estimates, the overall NMF between 1995 and 2000 was 91.3 million, corresponding
to 10.2% of the rural population in 2000. Our estimate implies an annual flow of 18.3 million migrants
between 1996 to 2000, (equal to an annual 2.3% of the rural population). This index is in line with
estimates of earlier studies. For instance, Ying (2003) estimates an annual flow between 17.5 and 19.5
million in the period 1996-2000.
Figure 4: The figure shows rural-urban migration rates by age and gender as a share of each cohort. The estimates are smoothed by five-year moving
averages.
The estimated age-gender-specific migration rates are shown in Figure 4. Both the female and male
migration rates peak at age twenty-five, with 7% for both females and males. The migration rate falls
gradually at later ages, remaining above 1% until age forty-five for males and until age forty-eight for
females. Migration becomes negligible which is less than 0.5% after age fifty.
Table 1 compares the actual migration structure with our estimates. We also include the estimation
in Song et al. (2015) to provide more information. Even though Song et al. (2015) can match the data
better between age 15 and 44, there exist two points in their paper worth doubting. First, they use
the data in 2000 to project the population and migration in 2005 and then target the age distribution
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Table 1: Age Structure of migration (%)
Age <15 15-29 30-44 45-59 60+
Ave. of 1995-2000 Census data 9.03 60.53 22.14 5.81 2.49
Simulation in this paper 15.48 51.51 27.07 7.33 -0.57
Simulation in Song et al. (2015) 25.8 64.8 26.5 -8.6 -8.6
of migration between 1995-2000 with their 2000-2005 projection. In fact, the distribution should be
different in these two different time intervals. Second, the two distributions in Song et al. (2015) after
age 45 are relatively large and negative. This may be due to their overestimation of "<15" group which
is 16.77% greater than the data. In fact, due to the culture in China that "people prefer to die at where
they were born", the rural-urban migrants could go back to rural when they become old, for example,
−0.57% of the 60+ group in this paper’s estimation. But the rural-urban migrants aged 45+ account for
a 17.2% reversal rural-urban migrants is less possible. Accordingly, the estimation in this paper is more
reasonable.
Figure 5 plots the old-age dependency ratio 13 for rural and urban areas (solid lines). We also plot the
old-age dependency ratio in the no migration counterfactual (dashed lines). The projected urban old-age
dependency ratio is 63% in 2050, but it would be as high as 90% in the no migration counterfactual.
The Chinese pension system only covers urban workers. Accordingly, its sustainability hinges on the
urban old-age dependency ratio. If we ignore the rural-urban migration, the population projection and
the calculation that is associated with the pension system are bias.
Figure 6 shows the projected population dynamics (solid lines). We also compare the population
model without migration (dash lines, counterfactual) with the population model with migration (bench-
mark). There are mainly three findings for the benchmark: first, the rural population declines over the
whole period; second, the urban population as a share out of the total population increases from 51% in
2010 to 83% in 2050 and to over 95% in 2100; third, between 2050 and 2100 there are two opposite forces
that tend to make the urban population stable: on the one hand, fertility becomes very low in urban
areas from 2050 to 210014; on the other hand, there decreasing rural population (red solid line), i.e., the
immigration to urban areas is still increasing and sizable, which offsets the negative urban population
growth.
Finally, Figure 7 plots the dynamics of China’s total population from 1995 to 2100. The simulated
population in the model of this paper is in solid line. The dashed line shows the population projection
by United Nation population forecasts. The population projection in this paper rises from 1.20 billion
to 1.38 billion until 2030 and then declines to 1.15 billion in 2100. The United Nation projection rises
from 1.22 billion to 1.41 billion until 2030 and then declines to 1.0 billion in 2100. Both the simulation
and the United Nation projection peak at around 2030 and start to decline. The comparison shows that
13the number of population aged 60+ as percentage of population in working age (15-60)
14The urban benchmark (black solid line) line become flat and even starts to decline after 2050
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Figure 5: The figure shows the projected old-age dependency ratios, defined as the ratio of population 60+ over population 18-59, for 1995-2100
(solid lines) broken down on urban and rural population. The dashed lines show the corresponding ratios under the zero migration counterfactual (i.e.,
the natural population dynamics).
Figure 6: The figure shows the projected population dynamics for 1995-2100 (solid lines) broken down by rural and urban population. The dashed
lines show the corresponding natural population dynamics (i.e., the counterfactual projection under a zero urban-rural migration scenario)
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Figure 7: The figure shows the comparison between the simulated population and the forecast of United Nation prospect.
this demographic model can project a valid population prediction.
4.2 Preferences
A period in the model stands for one year of real-time. The representative agent only has an impact
on the economy when she enters the labor market at age 22, works until age JW , which is the retirement
age in data in China as described in Section 1, and lives up to age J = 100. To focus on the period
(1995-2010) studied in this paper, the retirement age before 1995 is set to be 60. In particular, according
to the data, the retirement age from 1995 to 1998 is 55, from 1999 to 2004 it is 54 and the retirement age
is set to be 53 after 2005. Hence, workers retire after (JW = 22) years of work. The discount factor is set
to β = 1.01286 to match the average aggregate savings rate in China between 1995-2010 (i.e., 42.8%).
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply θ is set to equal to 0.5, in line with the classical estimation in labor
economics (Keane (2011)).
4.3 Labor income
To consistent with the estimated wages of workers with high school education in Ge and Yang (2014),
which is the median level of labor income, urban hourly wages are assumed to grow at the rate of 5.7%
between 1995 and 2013. From 2013 to 2031, the annual growth for this time interval is set to 4.9%. From
2031 to 2040, the annual growth is set to 3.6%. After 2040, to be in line with wage growth in the United
States over the last century, the annual wages grow at 2% per year.
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For the human capital variable ηj , it is matched to the average years of education by cohort according
to Barro and Lee (2013) before 1990. We linearly extrapolate ηj for cohorts born after 1990 and assume
that when the average years of schooling reach the current level for the US (i.e., 12), the growth ceases
in the year 2000. Per year of education is assumed to have an annual return of 10%.
We estimate the age-specific productivity {j}JWj=22 it using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) data and the method in Song and Yang (2010) to make it be consistent with the empirical
evidence on gross labor earnings for Chinese urban workers. This implies an average annual return to
the age-specific experience of 0.5%.
For the initial distribution of workers and retirees’ wealth in 1995, due to the missing survey in 1990
in the China Household Income Project (CHIP) and the limitation of CHIP(1988), we have to and can
only set the initial distribution of agents’ wealth in 1990 to be the same as the empirical distribution of
financial wealth in 1995 in the CHIP. We simulate the model throughout the 1990-1995 period given the
initial wealth distribution in 1990 to endogenously obtain the distribution of private wealth in 1995. To
exclude human capital growth, we discount it using an annual wage growth of 5.7%. The distribution of
that entrepreneurial wealth is obtained by assuming that all entrepreneurs are endowed with the same
initial wealth in 1990.
4.4 Technology
The capital share of output α is set to 0.5, which is in line with the estimate in Bai et al. (2006).
The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.1 such that the annual depreciation rate of capital is 10%.
We set the parameters ψ = 0.27 and χ = 2.73 to match the capital-output ratio and the rate of
return on capital of high productivity firms as documented by Song et al. (2011),respectively.
We set the initial level of productivity A0 to 9.6% of US’s GDP per capita in 1995. This yields a GDP
per capita equal to 20% of the US level in 2010, which is consistent with the data. Between 2000-2013,
we set the growth rate of productivity gt so that the model generates an average labor income growth
of 7.5%. After 2013, productivity growth is forecasted by Song et al. (2011) to slow down. Accordingly,
from 2013 to 2040 we linearly interpolate gt to fall to zero. In particular, between 2013 and 2040, China
is expected to grow at a rate of 6.5%. In this case, the GDP per capita in China will be 68% of the US
level by 2040 and remain stable while growing at the long-run world rate thereafter.
For the rural area, we set αr = 0.3 to match the investment rate in the rural area in 1995 data. The
rural wage grows at the rate that can generate the rural-urban wage gap to increase from 1.84 in 2000
to 3.48 in 2040 and stays constant thereafter.
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4.5 Financial Sector
The rate of return to capital for the firm is endogenously obtained from the production function.
The domestic interest rate is equal to the lending rate and the rate of return on foreign bonds. We set
the rate of return of the long-term U.S. Treasury bills to the value of the rate of return on foreign bonds
since a major fraction of China’s foreign reserves are invested in the U.S. T-bills.
We set the financial friction parameter ξ = 0.43 to match the fact as documented by Song et al.
(2011) that the Chinese firms on average have about 50% loan to assets ratio.
4.6 Government and pension system
Along the transition path, the actual data on government saving rate (as % of GDP) and government
investment rate (as % of GDP) are used for values of Sgt and I
g
t in Section 3.5.
In line with the 1995-1997 pension reform in Sin (2005), we assume that pensioners retiring before 1997
continued to earn a σ1 = 78% replacement rate throughout their retirement. Moreover, those retiring
after 1997 are entitled to a σ2 = 60% replacement rate. In the long-run, i.e., 2030, to balance the pension
fund, we set σ3 = 0.3913 as documented in Song et al. (2015). The reason is as follows. According to
Figure 7, both the UN projection and this paper’s simulation predict a peak of the population at around
2030. Afterward, the population will decline. This will reduce the population who contribute to the
pension system and finally ruin the sustainability of the pension system unless the government lowers
the pension replacement rate. We assume a constant social security tax equal to 20%, in line with the
empirical evidence. The indexation of the average wage is ν = 0.6 according to the pension rule in China.
This paper also takes into account the fact that the current pension system of China only covers a
fraction of the urban workers. The coverage rate has grown from 45% in 2001 to 60% in 2011 according
to China Statistical Yearbook 2012. Therefore, the pension coverage rate is assumed to be constant at
60%. Those non-covered workers neither pay the social security tax nor do they receive pension incomes.
The initial wealth of government P0 is set to 0.7% of GDP, matching the 43 billion RMB that is
the cumulative balance of pension fund for urban workers in 1995 according to the National Statistics
Bureau of China.
Table 2 summarizes all parameter values mentioned.
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Table 2: Parameters values in the benchmark model
Variable Description Value Source
Preference
β Subjective time discount factor 1.01286 Target average savings rate 1995-2010
θ Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.5 Keane (2011)
ζ Weight of leisure 1 Galindev (2009)
Technology
α Capital labor elasticity 0.5 Bai et al. (2006)
αr Capital labor elasticity (rural) 0.3 Target investment rate (rural) in 1995
δ Depreciation rate 0.1 Bai et al. (2006)
Financial Sector
ψ Share of output received by managers 0.27 Song et al. (2011)
χ Extra efficiency units per worker 2.73 Song et al. (2011)
ξ Financial friction parameter 0.43 İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018)
Pension System
τ Social Security Tax 0.20 Pension Rule in China
σ1 Pension Replacement Rate (<1997) 0.75 Pension Rule in China
σ2 Pension Replacement Rate (1997-2030) 0.60 Pension Rule in China
σ3 Pension Replacement Rate (>2030) 0.3913 Song et al. (2015)
ν Indexation of average wage 0.6 Pension Rule in China
5 Quantitative Results
In this section, we first construct a benchmark scenario with workers’ early retirement and pension
reform between 1995-1997 to show the validity of this model. Then we consider a set of alternative
scenarios to one-by-one analyze the two major mechanisms (i.e., early retirement effect and wealth
substitution effect) that cause the current account surplus in China.
5.1 The benchmark result
This section shows the benchmark results including the saving rate, the investment rate, and the
current account along the transition path. Before the initial steady state, a pre-transition simulation has
been run to derive the initial steady state under the two major following assumptions. First, we assume
that before 1990 workers supply 1 unit of labor and consume all the income. Second, before 1980, the
wage growth rate was 0; from 1980 to 1995, the wage growth rate is constant and equal to the wage
growth rate in 1980.
In 1995, we shock the initial steady state by both imposing the pension reform and the fact that
workers choose to retire earlier than the mandatory retirement age. In specific, for the early retirement,
being consistent with the data shown in Section 1, the retirement age from 1995 to 1998 is 55, from 1999
to 2004 it is 54 and the retirement age is set to be 53 after 2005 until the end of dynamic. As for the
pension reform, the pension replacement rate decreases from 0.78 to 0.60 following the pension rule in
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China. We use the actual data on the TFP growth rate, government saving rate and investment rate
(as % of GDP), and the rate of return on foreign bonds along the transition path and assume perfect
foresight for all these components.
Since this model does not capture the 2008 financial crisis, to avoid the impact of that crisis, we only
focus and compare the current account along the transition path generated by the model to the Chinese
data between 1995 to 2010 to evaluate whether the model is capable of accounting for the rise and the
fall in China’s current account surplus. The model that captures the 2008 financial crisis for a longer
comparing period will be further developed.
To target the current account data in the beginning year (i.e., 1995), the actual data of government
saving rates and investment rates (% of GDP) are used to calculate the gap between the simulated current
account and the actual current account in data in 1995. The first period of the simulated current account
is adjusted using the gap. Therefore it is exactly the same as the data in 1995. Then the gap grows by
adding the difference between government saving and investment next period along the transition path.
Finally, the growing gap in each period will be used to adjust the simulated current account, which is
the results shown in Figure 8.
The simulated benchmark economy and the data starting from 1995 are shown in Figure 8. In Panel
(a) of Figure (8), the time series path of the current account in the model, especially after the 2000s,
tracks the trend and fluctuation in the data reasonably well. In the data, after a hump-shaped change
between 1995-2000, the current account surplus increases from 1.7% of GDP in 2000 to 9.9% in 2007
and 9.1% in 2008. After 2008, it starts to decline to reach 6.6% in 2010 (see Table 3). In the benchmark
economy, the current account surplus experiences a similar hump-shaped fluctuation between 1995-2000.
Then it increases from 2.7% of GDP in 2000 to 8.4% in 2007 and 9.9% in 2008. After 2008, it starts
declining and reaches 3.9% of GDP in 2010. Given the model can match the persistent rise in the current
account in the 2000s well, we have to admit that, it over-predicts the current account surpluses from
1995-2000.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 8 show the aggregate saving and investment rates simulated by the model
and the data. Since in the calibration we set the time discount factor β to target the average saving
rates between 1995-2010 rather than the saving rate in the initial year, it is fair to claim that the model
can track the time path of China’s aggregate saving and investment rates reasonably well. In particular,
it captures the general increasing trends in the two rates between 2000-2008. In the data, the aggregate
saving rate increases from 36% to 52% between 2000 and 2008. During the same period, the investment
rate increases from 33% to 54%. In the simulated model, we can observe that the rate of change of
aggregate saving rate is increasing while the rate of change in the investment rate is decreasing during
this period. This results in an increase in the current account balance, which again confirm the trend in
panel (a).
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Figure 8: Current Account, Saving and Investment Along the Transition Path (Baseline)
Table 3: Current Account, Saving, Investment Along the Transition Path
1995 2000 2004 2007 2008 2010
Current Account (% of GDP)
Benchmark model 0.22 2.73 3.67 8.39 9.95 3.90
Data 0.22 1.69 3.52 9.94 9.14 6.63
5.2 Counterfactual and sensitivity analysis
This section explores the main reasons that drive the current account balance up in China. The
findings support that the increase in the current account balance up to 2008 is a result of the increase
in the household saving rate and the financial constraints facing the entrepreneurs. In addition, the rise
in the aggregate saving rates is jointly driven by the early retirement and pension reform in China in
the 1990s. In particular, the younger actual retirement age than the mandatory retirement age and the
reduced pension income due to the pension reform jointly led to the increase in the household saving
rate especially after 2000 as the actual retirement age become younger and younger15. Accompanied by
15Recalling that we follow the actual data of retirement age and set the retirement age in the model to be 55 from
1995-1998, 54 from 1999-2004 and 53 since 2005.
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the financial friction that stops the increased household saving being invested in domestic firms, the rise
in the saving rate finally results in large and increasing current account surpluses up to 2008.
5.2.1 Counterfactual 1: Early Retirement+ No Pension Reform
To examine the impact of the 1990s pension reform on the current account, we simulate a coun-
terfactual scenario in which the 1990s pension reform is never implemented. In particular, this means
that the pension replacement rate is 0.76 from the beginning to 2040. Figure 9 shows the results of
this experiment. Consistent with our "wealth substitution effect" mechanism,i.e., the pension income
can substitute for the savings that are prepared for the retirement period, the current account balance
is substantially lower during the entire period and the rise in the current account surplus after 2000 is
much smaller in this counterfactual economy. This is largely due to the decline in the saving rate as a
result of the increased pension income that is caused by the increased pension replacement rate from
0.60 to 0.78 between 1997-2040 compared with the case in the benchmark model. For the investment
side, this channel does not have the same impact on the investment behavior of the firms, consequently
giving rise to similar investment rates in the benchmark model as shown in panel (c) of Figure 8 and the
“Early+No Reform Model”.
Figure 9: Current Account, Saving and Investment Along the Transition Path (Early+No Reform)
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5.2.2 Counterfactual 2: No Early Retirement+ Pension Reform
To examine the impact of the early retirement on the current account, we simulate a counterfactual
scenario in which the early retirement never happens. In particular, this means that the actual average
retirement age is just exactly the same as the male mandatory retirement age, i.e., 60. Figure 10 shows
the results of this experiment. Consistent with our "early retirement effect" mechanism, i.e., people will
save more in order to cover a longer period over which the accumulated asset will be spread if they
retire earlier, the current account balance is substantially lower during the entire period and the rise in
the current account surplus after 2000 is much smaller in this counterfactual economy. This is largely
due to the decline in the saving rate as a result of no need to save more to cover the longer retirement
periods in the benchmark scenario with early retirement (panel (b) of Figure 8). Furthermore, when
we compare the current account and the saving rate in this scenario with panel (a) and panel (b) of
Figure 8, the “No Early+Reform Model” case drives down more current account and saving rate than
the “Early+No Reform Model” case. In panel (a) and panel (b) of Figure 9, the lowest point of current
account and saving rate are equal to -9% and 22% in 2001, respectively. However, in panel (a) and panel
(b) of Figure 10, the lowest point of current account and saving rate are equal to -4% and 38% in 2001,
respectively. Both the saving rate and current account are obviously smaller in Counterfactual 2 than in
Counterfactual 1. This means that the "early retirement effect" has a stronger positive effect on saving
rate thus on current account than the "wealth substitution effect" has. Again, this channel does not have
the same impact on the investment behavior of the firms, consequently giving rise to similar investment
rates in the benchmark model as shown in panel (c) of Figure 8 and the “No Early+Reform Model”.
5.2.3 Counterfactual 3: No Early Retirement+ No Pension Reform
To examine the joint impact of the 1990s pension reform on the current account, we simulate a
counterfactual scenario in which the early retirement never happens and the pension reform is never
implemented. In particular, this means that the pension replacement rate is 0.76 from the beginning to
2040 and the actual average retirement age is just exactly the same as the male mandatory retirement age,
i.e., 60. Figure 11 shows the results of this experiment. Consistent with our "wealth substitution effect"
and "wealth substitution effect" mechanisms, the current account balance is the lowest in all scenarios
during the entire period and the rise in the current account surplus after 2000 is much smaller in this
counterfactual economy. This is largely due to the decline in the saving rate as a result of the shorter
retirement periods and the increased pension income comparing with panel (b) of Figure 8. Finally, this
channel does not have the same impact on the investment behavior of the firms, consequently giving
rise to similar investment rates in the benchmark model as shown in panel (c) of Figure 8 and the “No
Early+No Reform Model”.
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Figure 10: Current Account, Saving and Investment Along the Transition Path (No Early+Reform)
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Figure 11: Current Account, Saving and Investment Along the Transition Path (Early+No Reform)
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6 Conclusion
The persistent long-run current account surplus and high saving rates in China have attracted the
sight of scholars for the past 20 years. However, very few pay attention to the prospect of the fact
that workers are actually retiring earlier than the mandatory retirement age and its interaction with the
pension system. In this paper, we analyze the positive and dominant effects of early retirement and its
interaction with the pension system with the aid of a dynamic model calibrated to China.
A number of existing studies more or less explore the relationship between the pension system reform
and saving rates, current account in China (see, e.g., Song et al. (2015), and He et al. (2019), İmrohoroğlu
and Zhao (2018)). Our analysis concurs with their view that the pension reform in the 1990s does have
an impact on the saving rates and even current account in China. We step further to explore a new
channel that is the early retirement effect: it would increase the saving rates due to people save more to
cover the longer periods over which the accumulated asset will be spread. In a society suffers financial
friction (i.e., the borrowing constraint to loan in banks) like China, this high saving and restricted
domestic investment would imply a current account surplus. Furthermore, the fact reflected in the data
that people are retiring earlier for the past 20 years drives the saving rates increasing, which results in
a growing current account surplus. That could be one of the necessary reason that China government is
gradually postponing the female mandatory retirement age from 50 to 55 and finally to 60 as the same
as the males.
The results are subject to some caveats. First, the fact that early retirement has a positive impact
on the saving rates and current account surplus in China. The earlier and earlier average retirement
age is one of the major reason that causes the growing current account surplus for the past 20 years.
Nevertheless, we do not allow the agent to retire endogenously while we just use the average retirement
age in the data. On the contrary to the restriction of integer retirement age in this model, the average
retirement age is non-integer in the data. The difference would cause estimation bias. In the future version
of this paper, the model will be extended into a model with endogenous retirement decision. Second, the
1990s pension reform has a positive impact on the saving rates and current account. However, we do not
follow the pension rule in China before and after the reform with 100% accuracy. We just follow Song
et al. (2015) and İmrohoroğlu and Zhao (2018). We do not model the subsequent series of pension reform
(e.g., the 2005 pension reform) in this paper. In the future version of this paper, these two points will be
considered into the model. Finally, we compare the two channels in this paper and find that the early
retirement effect has a larger impact on the saving rates and current account than the 1990s pension
reform has. Similar to Song et al. (2015), we abstract from the crowding-out effect of public pensions
on within-family old-age care, consider neither idiosyncratic nor inter-generational risk. We believe that
extending the analysis in these directions would not overturn our main insights.
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